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Numerous challenges to economic development confront
Caribbean island nations, including the fading away of trade
preferences arising from links with metropolitan ex-colonial
masters, and the primacy of the General Agreement on Tariffs
1 Lloyd B. Smith, CARICOM or "Cari-gone'?, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER
INTERNET EDITION, http:/www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/htmi/20040305t220000-
0500_56681 obs caricom-or__cargone .asp.
2 For example, the preferential access to the European market afforded to African,
Caribbean, and Pacific bananas ran afoul of the GATT/WTO system, stemming from a
challenge from South American producers with the backing of powerful U.S.
multinationals. See, e.g., Paul Sutton, The Banana Regime of the European Union, the
Caribbean, and Latin America, 39 J. OF INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1, 5-36
(1997). The system will phase out in 2008. Id. Negotiations continue, but their results
remain uncertain. In addition, the higher prices and subsidies paid by the European
Union for Caribbean sugar products on the world market have been found to violate the
GATT Agreement following challenges to the system's legitimacy by Brazil, Australia
and Thailand. See European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, 10-14,
WT/DS265/R, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/265re.doc. Even before
the WTO Panel report was publicly released, the European Union was already working
toward eliminating the subsidies. See Region's Sugar Industry Sees EU Ruling as Threat




and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) system
with its requirements of liberalization of economies and markets.3
Other challenges include the proximity and hegemony of the
United States in the hemisphere, the small geographic and market
size of most Caribbean states; the mono-agricultural production of
some of the smaller islands, and the diminished demand for
Caribbean agricultural products. Caribbean nations must also
contend with geographic dispersal, namely the consequent
challenge of building inter-island ties and the development of
regional distribution and transportation systems. Psychological
dispersal4 presents an additional challenge with its sense of
separateness arising from the lingering effects of historical
economic, legal, cultural and other dependence on colonial era
"mother" countries.
The focus of this article is the Caribbean Community
(hereinafter CARICOM or the Community), the group of
Caribbean states whose membership5 has expanded from the
exclusive core of English-speaking Caribbean countries to now
include Suriname and Haiti.6 Some years following the failure of
_obs region-s-sugarjindustry-sees -eu ruling.as threattoitssurvival .asp. In June
2005, the European Union announced a thirty-nine percent proposed decrease in the
prices that it will pay for African, Caribbean, and Pacific sugar. See Arlene Martin-
Wilkins, Sugar Price Cut to be Phased Over Four Years, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER
INTERNET EDITION, June 25, 2005, http://jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/
20050624t200000-0500_83007_obs-sugar-price cut to bephased overfouryears.asp.
3 See, e.g., Hilboume Watson, Global Neoliberalism, The Third Technological
Revolution and Global 2000: A Perspective on Issues Affecting the Caribbean on the Eve
of the 21 t Century, in CONTENDING WITH DESTINY: THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 382 (Kenneth Hall & Denis Benn eds., 2000) [hereinafter CONTENDING WITH
DESTINY].
4 See, e.g., Claude Robinson, The Media and Caribbean Integration, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, January 18, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver
.com/columns/html/20040118t010000-0500_54492_obsthemediaand caribbean_
integration.asp (reporting, through the prism of cricket, inter-island rivalries, and sense of
apartness).
5 The fifteen CARICOM Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
CARICOM Member States, http://www.caricom.org/index.jsp (follow "Community"
hyperlink, then "Members" hyperlink).
6 However, in response to Jamaica's hospitality to ousted President Jean Bertrand
Aristide, Aristide's successor in that office announced his intention to freeze all
communications/interaction with CARICOM. See Aristide Visit Triggers Row: Latortue
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the West Indian Federation,7 the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) was born from the vision of pioneering Caribbean
leaders 8  of newly-independent English-speaking Caribbean
islands. Its successor, CARICOM, was to take the lead in pooling
the strengths of the English-speaking states to foster their
economic development. Unfortunately, CARICOM has yet to live
up to its economic integration goals. 9 My inquiry will assess why,
three decades after its inception, the organization has not been
more successful in emulating the success of the European Union, a
paradigm of successful regional economic integration, l° and has
Freezes Relations with Caricom; Claims to Pull Envoy from Kingston, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, March 16, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.con/news/
htm1/20040315T230000-0500_57219_OBSARISTIDEVISIT_TRIGGERS_ROW.asp.
The Jamaican government subsequently announced that ex-President Aristide
would leave for exile in South Africa following elections there. See Powell Pledges
to Help Latortue on CARICOM Recognition: Says Probe of Aristide's Ouster
Would Serve No Purpose, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, April 6,
2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/htm-/20040406T010000-0500 58187 OBS
_POWELLPLEDGESTOHELPLATORTUEONCARICOMRECOGNITION
.asp. The announcement regarding Haiti's freezing of its relationship with CARICOM
was later rescinded. See Ricky Singh, 3 Leaders Say 'No' to Latortue, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, March 23, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/
html/20040323t000000-0500_57575_obs_leaders say nojto latortue.asp. CARICOM
Member States continue to refuse to recognize the provisional government. See Latortue
Slams Mbeki, Hails Patterson, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, October 18,
2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20041017T220000-0500_67832_
OBSLATORTUESLAMSMBEKIHAILSPATTERSON.asp. The Member States
have continued to call for a peaceful resolution of the crisis which accords with
democratic ideals and procedures. See Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the
Sixteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of
the Caribbean Community, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives
/communiques-hgc/16inthgc-2005-communque.htm.
7 See infra Part II for a description of the West Indian Federation.
8 "While conceding ... the enduring viability of the idea of regionalism during the
post-1962 era, it must be conceded that actors like Vere Bird, Forbes Burnham, Errol
Barrow, Eric Williams and Michael Manley were indispensable for its actualisation."
The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments, in THE UWI-CARICOM PROJECT 6 (Duke E.
Pollard ed., 2003).
9 See infra Part III for further discussion.
10 Through the European Coal and Steel Community, later the European
Community and the European Union, former enemy European nations have sought to
effect broad integration through the engine of the single market. A paradigm of regional
integration it may be, but even in the European Union there are certain aspects of
sovereignty that Member States refuse to concede. For example, the United Kingdom
has so far opted out of the Euro zone, which would entail surrendering the pound, its
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not achieved the integration of economies that is one of its stated
central purposes.'" Specifically, I will explore the role of
"sovereignty" as an obstacle to economic integration 12 and address
the impact of the Member States' conceptions of sovereignty on
those goals.
The comparative advantage justification for free trade assumes
that each trading partner will provide different goods for which its
partners will be willing to pay. Given the similarity of the goods
and services produced in the islands, the fundamental question
arises whether the Caribbean nation states create a natural market
for each others' goods and services. It may be argued that this
reality is a flaw at the center of the economic integration endeavor
of the English-speaking islands. If most of the islands produce
similar agricultural goods and analogous tourism experiences, and
only Trinidad and Tobago's petroleum production offers a sharp
distinction in the offering of trade goods, will integration of the
Member States' economies confer the development benefits
sought by the Community?
In addition, does the comparatively small size of the
CARICOM market create an insurmountable obstacle to
integration and effective economic development? A small,
integrated market may be no more attractive to foreign investment
than smaller scattered markets of disparate size. A definitive
answer to these and similar questions, which merit further study, is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I accept the validity of the
path pursued by the CARICOM Member States through the
domestic currency, as well as primary control of domestic monetary policy. In late May
and early June 2005, voters in France and The Netherlands rejected in separate referenda
the adoption of the European Union Constitution. See Dan Bilefsky, Dutch Rejection of
Charter Sparks Larger EU Fears, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at A3. Their rejection has
created a roadblock in a process of deepening European integration. Id.
11 The three principal goals of the original constitutive treaty of the Community,
the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common
Market (the 1973 Treaty), are economic integration, functional coordination, and
coordination of foreign policy. See 1973 Treaty, Article 4 reprinted in Pollard, supra
note 8. For further discussion, see Part IV infra. The 1973 Treaty was executed at
Chaguaramas, Trinidad, on July 4, 1973, and came into force on August 1, 1973.
12 "Economic integration," as used in this paper, evokes the integration achieved
through the creation of a single economic space, including federal systems such as
Canada or the United States, or that toward which the European Union has made
significant strides.
2005]
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CARICOM treaties and official pronouncements,13 and I focus on
the effectiveness of the mechanisms created to effect that
integration.
A central hypothesis of this article is that the mythology of
sovereignty may explain the continuing aspirational state of
Caribbean economic integration: whereby economic integration,
through the creation of a single economic space shared by the
Member States, remains an ideal evoked in speeches, but is not yet
real. Moreover, the privileging of sovereignty and efforts to guard
it have led to the creation of an organizational structure lacking in
cohesion and supranational scope. This structure is bereft of the
ability or power to enforce Member State implementation of the
common market.
Some indicators of the failure of the Community's economic
integration effort14 are revealed by the imponderables of these
perhaps rhetorical questions: Why weren't the CARICOM
members and their populations-English-speaking and a virtual
stone's-throw away from the United States-positioned to
undertake some of the high technology and call center jobs moved
and moving offshore to countries such as India, China, and
Mexico? Why did CARICOM members not have the ability to
coordinate negotiation with the United States to draw up a
template of the Shiprider Agreements 5 that were executed by so
13 See, e.g., Press Release, CARICOM, CARICOM Press Release of February 16,
2005, Single Market, Global Cooperation Highlighted at Suriname Meeting (Feb. 16,
2005), http://www.cmm.org/documents/press-release 2005/16th-intersessional/opening
_ceremony_16intersessional-suriname.pdf ("Today, the task of our generation is to see
to the implementation (of the CSME) through to finality, and we can afford no slippage,"
quoting Secretary General of CARICOM, Mr. Edwin Carrington.).
14 See, e.g., Legal Regime of Free Trade in Services, Vol.1: No. 6 TRADE WINS
(2001), for a summary of a report commissioned by the Caribbean Export Development
Agency outlining the challenges faced by regional businesses due to the lack of
implementation of economic integration commitments. They include an unpredictable
investment climate due to domestic ministerial discretion in the issuance of licenses,
discrimination between domestic and "foreign" firms, and other protectionist policies.
Id.
15 The agreements, more formally termed "Agreements Concerning Co-operation
in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking," allowed the United States to
undertake wide-ranging drug interdiction activities within the territorial waters of the
island states. See, e.g., Nicole Clarke, Current Developments in International Law:
"Shiprider Agreements," 2 CARIB. L.B. 61 (1997). It is sadly ironic that jealously held
sovereignty has stymied the Community's economic integration goals; yet, of the
[Vol. 31
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many smaller CARICOM members? Why does CARICOM not
have a merchant marine to facilitate intra-Community trade, or a
joint coast guard or navy force that would contribute to
safeguarding the security, marine heritage, and resources of the
member countries? In an era of globalization and the wealth
creation of knowledge systems, why is there no Community patent
and trademark office to facilitate Community protection and
exploitation of technological and other intellectual property rights
created within CARICOM? 16 These economic development gaps
are clear, and I posit that it is the fear of loss of sovereignty and
the seduction of a myth of sovereignty that have prevented the
Community from implementing the economic integration
envisioned in 1973. After fifteen years of delay, the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME) was finally scheduled for
launch in January 2005.1' The date of launch was further delayed
to December 2005.18 The launch of the Caribbean Court of
Justice, scheduled for November 2004, was delayed until the first
quarter of 2005,19 and finally came into effect on April 16, 2005.20
CARICOM countries, only Barbados and Jamaica successfully negotiated agreements
that placed some limitations on the scope of United States activities in those countries'
territorial waters and stipulated (mostly symbolic) reciprocity of the rights and
obligations of the United States and Caribbean signatories. Id. See also Kathy Brown,
Now That the Ship Has Docked: A Postscript to the Shiprider Debate in The Caribbean
Community, in THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: BEYOND SURVIVAL 527-35 (Kenneth 0.
Hall, ed., 2001) [hereinafter BEYOND SURVIVAL].
16 Article 66 of the Revised Treaty (hereinafter defined) obligates the Council on
Trade and Economic Development to promote intellectual property rights through,
among other things, the strengthening of intellectual property regimes and the
establishment of a regional administration of intellectual property rights (other than
copyright). That regime is not yet in place. See Havelock R. Brewster, The Caribbean
Single Market and the Economy: Is it Realistic Without Commitment to Political Unity?
Mar. 14, 2003, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/csme-politicalunity-brewster.htm.
17 See Rickey Singh, Awaiting Outcome of Next Month's CSME Summit, THE
JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, Oct. 10, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com
/columns/html/20041010T000000-0500_67391_OBS_AWAITINGTHEOUTCOME_
OFNEXTMONTHSCSME_SUMMIT.asp.
18 See Tracey Thompson, Despite Size, Region Can Compete in FTAA-Dr.
Hamilton JAMAICA INFORMATION SERVICE, March 17, 2005, http://www.jis.gov.jm
/foreign-affairs/html/20040316t070000-0500_2003_jis-despitesize_region can_compete
_inftaa__drhamilton.asp.
19 Singh, supra note 17. The launch of both the CSME and the Caribbean Court of
Justice were delayed by a ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the
House of Lords of the United Kingdom finding unconstitutional the enactment by
2005]
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Analysis of many factors indicate that the reluctance of
Member States to relinquish sovereign powers and prerogatives to
the regional organization has undermined the CARICOM
economic integration endeavor. These factors include the
diffusion of powers and responsibilities within CARICOM, the
non-allocation of legislative initiative and power to the purely
CARICOM Organs and Institutions, the husbanding of decision-
making capacity by the Heads of Government Conference and
Council of Ministers-the primary Organs2' of the Community-
and the halting and incomplete progress toward the CSME that
was introduced with much fanfare in 1989.22 Caribbean leaders,
blinded by a seductive myth of sovereignty, allowed the economic
development opportunity presented by CARICOM to falter. While
regional integration has achieved notable success in cultural,
educational, and other functional23 spheres, economic integration
remains aspirational" 4 -a moving will o' the wisp not yet fully
embraced.
Part II provides a short, historical background of the Caribbean
Jamaica of legislation to install the Caribbean Court of Justice as the court of final
appeal. See infra note 230 for additional details.
20 See Press Release, CARICOM, CARICOM Press Release of April 16, 2005,
Caribbean Court of Justice is Inaugurated (Apr. 16, 2005), http://www.caricom.org/jsp
/pressreleases/pres82_05.htm.
21 See infra Part V for explanation of upper case terms in this paragraph.
22 See Byron Blake, Asst. Secretary-General, Regional Trade and Economic
Integration, CARICOM Secretariat, Importance of, and state of implementation
of the CSME: presentation at Consultation on Antigua's obligation under the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy, August 25, 2003, http://www.caricom.org
/jsp/speeches/csme-importanceandimplementation-blake.htm (Aug. 25, 2003); Leela
Narinesingh, Caribbean Single Market Economy . . . A Process, Not an Event, THE
TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, May 19, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2005-05-22
/bussguardian 16.html.
23 "Functional cooperation" is one of the three principal goals of CARICOM,
encompassing areas such as weather reporting (the Caribbean Meteorological Society),
fisheries (the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism), and tourism (the Caribbean
Tourism Organization). The other goals are economic integration and the co-ordination
of Member State foreign policy. See 1973 Treaty, supra note 11, art. 4.
24 See generally Brewster, supra note 16 (summary of the lack of implementation
in such diverse spheres as competition policy, dispute settlement, free movement of the
factors of production, and fiscal policy harmonization). See also David S. Berry, The
New Caribbean Community: An Introduction to the Institutional Changes in the Revised
Treaty ofChaguaramas, 7 CARIB. L.B. 1, 2-3 (2002).
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region, including the English-speaking Caribbean, pointing to the
origins of the cultural and political divisions remaining from the
colonial experience. Part III contextualizes the CARICOM
experiment by briefly outlining the worldwide development of
regionalism and institutional minima for the attainment of
economic integration. Moreover, Part III will discuss the terms
"myth of sovereignty" and "aspirational economic integration."
Part IV briefly summarizes the modem history of Caribbean
regional integration, from the failure of the West Indian Federation
to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Part V outlines the
CARICOM institutional structure, illuminating the diffusion of
power within the organization through the proliferation of
Community organizations, and analyzing some of the advantages
and disadvantages of the chosen framework. Part V also compares
the CARICOM institutional structures to the principal institutions
of the European Union, to highlight characteristics reflecting
CARICOM's inspiration by, or rejection of, European Union
institutional choices. Part VI discusses the new dispute settlement
mechanisms of the Revised Treaty, the lawmaking power of the
Community, and the lack of participation by the Caribbean people
in the regional economic integration process. The Conclusion
surveys some current developments and looks ahead to prospects
for the CARICOM economic integration project.
II. The Caribbean Story'
The Caribbean Basin, "discovered" during Christopher
Columbus's first voyage in 1492, includes the hundreds of islands
in the Caribbean Sea and countries on the mainland that encircle it.
Columbus's arrival preceded the invasion of the New World
by Spanish conquistadors, English and French pirates, and settlers
as well as Dutch merchants. In the hundreds of years in their role
25 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which amended the 1973 treaty that established
the Caribbean Community, has not yet been executed by all the CARICOM Member
States. See generally Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing The Caribbean
Community including The CARICOM Single Market and Economy, CARICOM, July 4,
1973, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised treaty-text.pdf [hereinafter the
Revised Treaty].
26 A complete history of the Caribbean is beyond the scope of this article. Readers
interested in a more detailed history should see, for example, J. H. PARRY ET AL., A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE WEST INDIES (4th ed. 1987).
2005]
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as a contested European theatre of action, the island and mainland
territories witnessed, among other things, the following: the
eradication of indigenous people from most of the islands; the
creation of colonies that produced beef for conquistadors in
Mexico and tobacco, sugar, and bananas for Europe; the
introduction of the African Slave Trade and slavery; revolts; the
Haitian Revolution; eventual emancipation of the slaves on the
remaining islands; the Spanish-American War; World War II and
pre-independence struggles; and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The islands frequently changed hands among the European
powers, resulting in the diversity of languages, cultures, and
political systems existing today on the islands and in the mainland
territories of North, Central, and South America. While the
English, Spanish, and French had the largest colonial territories in
the Caribbean, the Dutch and Swedes were also present in the
theatre of influence.
The cultural, economic, and political ties resulting from each
territory's particular interaction with the European powers has
created "naturally" occurring exclusive groupings: St. Maartens,
St. Eustatius, Saba, Curacao, Bonaire, and Aruba look to the
Netherlands; Guadeloupe, St. Martin, Martinique and St.
Barthelemy look to France; Cuba and Puerto Rico look to Spain
and the United States. The territories commonly referred to as the
Commonwealth Caribbean and/or the British West Indies are: the
British Virgin Islands, The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the
Turks and Caicos Islands, Jamaica, Trinidad, Montserrat,
Anguilla, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts, Nevis,
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Belize, and Guyana.
Following its own fight for independence, the United States of
America, a relative newcomer to the Caribbean theatre of action,
acquired Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands through warfare
and purchase of territories.
Prior to the gradual concession of the territories of their
individual independence, Britain first attempted to consolidate the
Caribbean colonies' political existence into the West Indian
Federation, a federal political organization of all of Britain's West
Indian territories. The federal system was, rejected by successive
popular referenda in Jamaica and Trinidad, and their consequent
withdrawal led to the collapse of the Federation. Beginning in
1962 with Jamaica, the British territories were granted
(Vol. 31
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independence from their colonial master. Following the ill-fated
experiment in federation, each island has been "going it alone,"
except those territories such as Montserrat, Anguilla, and the
Turks and Caicos Islands that remain dependent territories of the
United Kingdom.
The colonial influence continues to be strong with respect to
language, culture, political infrastructure, and education. It is
impossible to forget that Jamaica, the first independent British
West Indian territory, has been a separate state for only forty-two
years, while other members of the Community, such as
Montserrat, continue to be dependent territories. Necessarily, the
integration movements that followed the federation experiment
must be analyzed in light of the Member States' colonial past and
the brief duration of their independent existence.
III. Regional Integration and the Challenge of Sovereignty
To contextualize the CARICOM integration effort amid
worldwide developments, this Part summarizes the post-World
War II increase in regionalism, classical sovereignty under
international law, the reasons Caribbean nation state sovereignty
may be more mythic than real, and defines "aspirational economic
integration."
A. Regionalism
The twentieth century has borne witness to a rising tide of
regionalism: countries in far-flung geographic concentrations have
created organizations meant to strengthen ties that they hope will
bring greater economic well-being, political security, and the
fostering of cultural links.27 While states have formed regional
groupings for hundreds of years,2" that movement has accelerated
since the end of World War 11.29 Included among the new regional
27 See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419,
423-35 (2001) (discussing and analyzing some of the theories put forward to explain the
modem rise in regional trading blocs).
28 For example, a customs union formed among small German states in the early
1800s. Id. at 420.
29 See generally Joseph L. Brand, The New World Order of Regional Trading
Blocks, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155 (1992) (defining trading blocs and showing
how the blocs may affect agricultural consultants).
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groupings are the European Union,3" the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the African Union, the Association of
Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), and CARICOM. The purposes
actuating the formation of the groups vary, including regional
security, cultural ties, and economic or industrial development
through increased trade. The purposes of integration can and will
overlap,3 and these evolving purposes determine the type and
structure of the regional grouping.
Some regional organizations32 may take the form of trading
blocs,33  while others-notably the European Union and
30 Throughout this article the European Union is used as a comparator for
CARICOM's implementation of its stated integration purpose and its institutional
structure. The question arises: Is the European Union the most appropriate comparator
for CARICOM, or would the African Union or MERCOSUR be more suitable? The vast
disparity between the two regional organizations with respect to the size of population
and geographic area, the potential for intra-regional trade, and the development status of
the Member States begs the question. Despite these disparities, the usefulness of the
European Union as a comparator is strongly convincing due to the importance of the
following: (1) in the author's opinion, it is the most successful regional integration
experiment of sovereign states in the world, (2) a comparison of the CARICOM and
European Union treaties reveals that CARICOM drafters have been inspired by (and on
occasion rejected) salient features of the European Union structure (see infra Part VB for
discussion), and (3) like the European Union, the CARICOM treaties provide for the
creation of a single market, a single economic space outside the context of a federation
of states. See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, Preamble; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C325), 39
[hereinafter Consolidated Treaty].
31 For example, the rationales behind the formation of the European Communities
include: as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union, the prevention of another war between
Germany and France, and the acceleration of the rebuilding of Europe's economies
following World War II. Cho, supra note 27.
32 Examples of regional organizations include the European Community, the
Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN), and the Mercado do Sur (Mercosur).
See Allan S. Galper, Restructuring Rules of Origin in the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Agreement: Does the EC-Israel Association Agreement Offer an Effective Model? 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2028 n.50 (1996).
33 Article XXIV of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
counterintuitively encourages regional trading blocs. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, art. 24, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter the "GATT
Agreement"]. Such encouragement is counterintuitive in view of the underpinning trade
liberalization principles of GATT Agreement, such as National Treatment and Most
Favored Nation, which must be applied by each GAIT member to every other member.
Extension of more beneficial trade terms to a smaller subset of members would appear to
contravene those principles of GATT. However, viable explanations for the seeming
contradiction include: (1) the capitulation of the GATT drafters to the reality of a drive
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CARICOM-seek to establish a deeper34 and wider35 association
of states. A typical regional trading bloc may create either a free
trade area 36-where members ban tariffs and quotas on each
others' products and agree not to discriminate against each others'
products, or a customs union-where all members impose a
common external tariff on imports from non-members while
lowering or eliminating intra-member tariffs. Both the European
Union and the Caribbean Community seek to create a single
economic market as a centerpiece of their regional integration
efforts.
37
A single economic market advances several steps beyond the
integration fostered by a regional trading bloc. Core features of
economic integration and a single economic space include the
removal of barriers or impediments to the movement of the two
mobile classic factors of production-labor and capital-as well
as goods and services. Another feature includes the harmonization
of laws that affect the single market, including, among others,
competition, intellectual property, and regulatory standards for
products.38
Analysis of the European integration project indicates that
minimum requirements of the achievement of economic
integration among sovereign states include: (1) limited opt-out
opportunities on the part of Member States; (2) the direct effect
toward regionalism, and (2) recognition that experimentation with limited (i.e., regional)
liberalization of trade, may act as training wheels that lead to full-fledged acceptance of
the benefits of multilateral liberalization. For some discussion of the reasons underlying
GATT/WTO indulgence of this seeming contradiction, see Cho, supra note 27.
34 The ambit of a regional organization is deepened by the addition of spheres of
competence that increase the penetration of the regional organization's activities and
authority in the formerly purely internal domestic affairs of its membership. A deeper
association of Member States is a necessary precursor to the creation of a single
economic space.
35 A regional organization's sphere of influence is widened by the expansion of its
membership to include a growing number of members that increases or broadens the
territorial ambit of the organization.
36 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
37 See Preambles to the Revised Treaty, supra note 25, and the Consolidated
Treaty, supra note 30.
38 See, e.g., George Berman et al., Cases and Materials on European Union Law
536-37 (2d ed. 2002).
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and supremacy of measures intended to cause economic
integration, as well as limited time and enforcement periods for
implementation; (3) an independent supranational body that
drives, polices and enforces economic integration; (4) removal of
barriers to the mobile factors of production, such as capital and
labor; (5) a legitimate dispute settlement mechanism with
enforcement powers; (6) a strategic planning/decision making
mechanism that defies deadlock; and (7) private rights of action
against the Member States.
Such regional integration arrangements among states, with the
attendant effects of cultural, economic, and functional integration,
implicate and threaten-perhaps more than a typical international
treaty-the sovereign power of Member States. This threat arises
from the need to create a central body with supranational powers
to design, build, and monitor the common economic space, in
particular, through enforcement of Member State implementation
and coordination.
B. Sovereignty
The classical conception of state sovereignty is an absolute one
that envisions the State with its rights within its territory unfettered
by laws or other constraints39 and with laws applicable to extra-
territorial actions imposed only through its consent or the coercion
of other states. 4°
Since the end of World War II, that absolutist concept has
evolved to a more nuanced view of the powers, duties,
responsibilities, and restraints on state sovereignty." Indeed, of
39 "[S]tates assert, in relation to [their] territory and population, what may be called
internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that
territory or population." HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF WORLD
POLITICS 8 (2d ed. 1977).
40 "[States] assert ... what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant
not supremacy but independence of outside authorities." Id.
41 For example, shortly after World War II, Judge Alavarez of the International
Court noted, with respect to a dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania: "We
can no longer regard sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every State, as
used to be done under the old law founded on the individualist rdgime, according to
which States were only bound by the rules which they had accepted. To-day, owing to
social interdependence and to the predominance of the general interest, the States are
bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will." The Corfu Channel
Case, 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion by Judge Alvarez) (emphasis
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"sovereignty," it has been said that "[w]hile respect for the
fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains central,
it is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and
exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so
absolute as it was conceived to be in theory.,
42
As scholars and jurists have questioned the import of
sovereignty and analyzed the decline in the absolutist conception,43
Professor Louis Henkin, a leading international law scholar, has
gone so far as to question the legitimacy' of the concept of
sovereignty: he has characterized sovereignty as a myth, noting the
sometimes deleterious impact on human rights, the environment,
and other competing international norms.4 5 Henkin argues that the
transposition of the concept of sovereignty from the domestic
sphere-that is, "the relations between the sovereign and his or her
subjects"4 6 to the international sphere, was an error that has
resulted in "distortion" and "confusion., 47  Henkin further points
out that globalization, human rights, and the need to cooperate on
the international front-including intervention in states' violent
domestic conflicts-have altered the understanding of
sovereignty.48
Adherence to the absolutist conception of sovereignty can be
viewed as a reaction to the experience of colonization. Former
added); see also John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National
Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "Un-Signing" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of
Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J. 245, 261-62 (2004) (arguing for a functional re-conception
of sovereignty that reflects the current nature of international law and the relationships
among states).
42 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 98
(1992).
43 See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in
the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 263 (1996) ("At an institutional level,
the rise of a preoccupation with internationalism and interdependence has brought with it
a recognition that absolute state sovereignty is neither desirable nor possible.").
44 Louis Henkin, Lecture, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and
Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) ("It is part of my thesis that
the sovereignty of states in international relations is essentially a mistake, an illegitimate
offspring.").
45 Id. at 2-3.
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colonies and their leaders, newly emerged from the domination of
more powerful developed states, have viewed the classical
attributes of sovereignty as a bulwark against further domination
and a mechanism through which to assert demands for the equality
of all states in the international system.49 In addition, the powers
stemming from the absolutist conception of sovereignty proved
attractive and useful to totalitarian leaders seeking wide discretion
to bolster their individual power.5 °  The reluctance to cede
elements of this broad conception of sovereignty continues to
create obstacles for the development of true regional integration.
One commentator notes:
Though regional integration made economic sense, it would
have taken political power away from the elites of these
countries. For example, states were unwilling to cede any
significant power to regional secretariats, which resulted in
heads of states of member nations acting as supreme decision-
making authorities.... For this reason, the disintegration of
virtually all integration initiatives in developing countries may
largely be blamed on rigid adherence to the state sovereignty
doctrine .....
C. The Myth of Sovereignty
Having inherited the classical conception of sovereignty from
their colonial masters amidst the doctrinal contraction of the
theory,52 the leaders of the Caribbean states, in reaction to the
cognitive dissonance engendered by the contradiction between the
reality of "sovereign" independence and the myth, hew closely to
the myth and keep a tight grasp on the shreds of sovereignty left to
49 See, e.g., P. Kenneth Kiplagat, An Institutional and Structural Model for
Successful Economic Integration in Developing Countries, 29 TEX. INT'L Ex. L.J. 39, 41-
44 (1994).
50 Id. at 42. Christophe Mullerleile, in his thorough study of the Commonwealth
Caribbean integration process, points percipiently to the reluctance of leaders of
significant stature within the confines of their small nations to broaden the ambit of
activity where they might lose in stature and importance-that is, the big-fish-in-the-
small-pond syndrome. See Christophe Mullerleile, CARICOM INTEGRATION: PROGRESS
AND HURDLES-A EUROPEAN VIEW 299 (Fitzroy Fraser trans., Kingston Publishers Ltd.,
1996).
51 Kiplagat, supra note 49, at 43-44 (emphasis added).
52 See, e.g., LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
2-3 (4th ed. 2001).
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them. The inability to concede to a newly constructed regional
organization, CARICOM, has created a barrier to the aspired-to
economic integration.
While it must be acknowledged that CARICOM has
encountered many challenges throughout its history,53 it :s
nevertheless apparent that the opportunities presented by the
chance to work together in an integrated fashion have been poorly
utilized.54  Instead, the reluctance of Caribbean leaders to pool
their collective sovereignties is manifested in the creation of a
weak institutional framework for CARICOM, the inadequate
dispute settlement and enforcement provisions, and slow
integration of of CARICOM treaty obligations into national law.
Further, the unilateralist approach of some CARICOM members
has undercut the potential of the organization.56
The word "myth" has several meanings, two of which are
pertinent to this analysis: (1) a story or tale whose re-telling
reveals an essential psychological, emotional, or cultural truth;57
53 See Pollard, supra note 8, at 18 (speaking of the oil crises of the 1970s that
emerged shortly after the signing of the founding 1973 Treaty); see also Owen Arthur,
The Future of the Caribbean Community and Common Market in BEYOND SURVIVAL,
supra note 15, at 622, 622-630; see generally Richard L. Bemal, The Caribbean in the
International System: Outlook for the First Twenty Years of the Twenty-First Century in
CONTENDING WITH DESTINY, supra note 3, at 295. Other challenges include small
market size,"limited range of natural resources," severe dependence on developed
economies for both aid and economic activity, and "susceptibility to natural disasters."
See P. K. Menon, Regional Integration: A Case Study of the Caribbean Community
[CARICOM], 5 CARIB. L. REV. 81, 105-106 (1995).
54 See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
55 See Brewster, supra note 16. Only in March 2004, four months shy of the third
anniversary of the finalization of the text of the Revised Treaty, did the Jamaican Senate
pass a bill to repeal legislation under the 1973 Treaty and implement the CSME. See
Senate Passes Bill to Repeal Common Market Act, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET
EDITION, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040330t200000-0500_57906_
obs.senate passes billto-repeal commonmarketact.asp. The Revised Treaty was
finalized July 2001. See Pollard, supra note 8, at 22.
56 For example, following the entry into force of the NAFTA Agreement among
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, two of the larger Community members, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago, decided to pursue individual arrangements to join the NAFTA
zone. See, e.g., Vaughan A. Lewis, Looking from the Inside Outwards: The Caribbean
in the International System after 2000 in CONTENDING WITH DESTINY, supra note 3, at
329, 336.
57 A myth may be defined as "a traditional, typically ancient story dealing with
supernatural beings, ancestors or heroes that serves as a fundamental type in the
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and (2) a lie,5 8 a sham, a charade, or perhaps an unattainable yet
sought-after goal.
For the Member States of the Community, as for many former
colonies, the myth of sovereignty is both a yearned-for
psychological and essential truth and a factual lie. It is a "truth"
which they crave, as an essential characteristic of the free people
and states they now are, with the ability and right to say to the rest
of the world, including their former colonial masters: "Here, thou
shalt not pass." It is a "lie" because economic, political and geo-
strategic realities place limitations on the ex-colonies' ability to
act externally (or even internally), limitations which may not be
imposed on longer-established and more powerful nations.59 One
might paraphrase Orwell as stating, "All sovereign states are
equal. But some are more equal than others."
60
For Caribbean nations, as for other former colonies, the
construction and deconstruction6 1 of sovereignty is particularly
worldview of a people, as by . . . delineating the psychology, customs, or ideals of
society." See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
ed. 2003), http://dictionary.reference.com/search?=myth. For example, in the Anancy
tales of Jamaica, the eponymous anti-hero is an arch trickster who navigates his social
obligations and the challenges of daily life through deception and duplicity, mirroring
the stratagems employed for survival by Africans involuntarily transported to the island
for labor. Anancy thus personifies the quality of survival so admired by Jamaicans. See
Joyce Jonas, ANANCY IN THE GREAT HOUSE: WAYS OF READING WEST INDIAN FICTION
51-53 (1990). Respect for those who confound authority figures is strongly imbued in
modem Jamaican character.
58 The Oxford English Dictionary includes in its definition of "myth": "A
widespread but untrue or erroneous story or belief; a widely held misconception; a
misrepresentation of the truth." See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed.
2005), http://www.oed.com.
59 For example, in 2003, the U.S. and an international coalition of countries
invaded Iraq (a sovereign nation) despite U.N. Security Council disapproval. See, e.g.,
Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEo. L.J. 173, 233 (2004).
It is hard to imagine that Argentina, for example, could invade Brazil with the same sang
froid and absence of international sanctions.
60 See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM: A FAIRY STORY 43 (First Signet Classic
prtg.1956) (1946) ("All animals are equal. But some are more equal than others.").
61 Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction exposes unquestioned assumptions
and "internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language." See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at "deconstruction." While newly independent ex-
colonies expected to command the attributes of sovereignty of their colonial "mother"
countries, in fact their poverty, lack of preparation and infrastructure deficits confined
them to a quasi-state status. See generally Robert H. Jackson, QUASI-STATES:
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challenging. Not only must the reverberations in the region of
United States hegemony62-which is acutely experienced due to
the islands' small size and proximity-be an integral part of the
formula, so must the nations' recent emergence from colonialism
and their people's desire to exercise newly won self-
determination. More recently, the shocks of globalization, the
collapse of the Lome Convention's 63 banana regime,64 and the U.S.
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
62 To the Monroe Doctrine (whereby the U.S. informed the colonial powers of the
Old World that the New World was now an exclusively U.S. sphere of influence) of the
nineteenth century must be added multiple occupations of Haiti, the continuing embargo
of Cuba, and the 1980s invasion of Grenada. See, e.g., John Maxwell, Our Debt Is Long
Past Due, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, http://www.jamaicaobserver
.com/columns/html/20040328t030000-0500_57787_obs_ourdebt is-long-past due.asp
(arguing in favor of CARICOM intervention to assist the people of Haiti) ("In 1994, the
Americans were intervening for the 29th time in Haiti."). While fear of the Soviet Union
and resistance to U.S. economic domination sharpened the war-weary stimulus to the
formation and successful integration of the European Union, the proximity and
hegemony of the United States has undermined regional integration attempts in the
Caribbean, perhaps because no counterbalancing "great" power has strong strategic
interests in the region. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 39, at 265.
63 The First Lome Convention, marking the beginning of the cooperation between
Europe and the ACP Group (Secretariat of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of
States (ACP Group)), came into effect in 1975 and was signed by 46 African states and
nine European countries. Lome Convention I, ACP-EEC, Feb. 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 595
(European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: ACP-
EEC). The Convention accorded non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP countries
and established Stabex: a mechanism for compensating losses in export earnings caused
by price fluctuations. The Second Lome Convention, marked the advent of Sysmin: a
mechanism similar to Stabex but concerned with mining products. Lome Convention II,
ACP-EEC, Oct. 31, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980). The Third Lome Convention
emphasized food self-sufficiency for ACP States, while the Fourth Lome Convention
introduced a political dimension of cooperation. Lome Convention III, ACP-EEC, Dec.
8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 571 (1985); Lome Convention IV, ACP-EEC, Dec. 15, 1989, 29
I.L.M. 783 (1990).
64 Further evidencing Caribbean states' inability to direct their future is the fact that
the breakdown of this system stems from a dispute within the GATT/WTO organization
between the EU and the U.S. and some Latin American states acting as the proxies of
U.S. big business. See Sutton, supra note 2, at 5-13. The GATT/WTO system's dispute
settlement rules meant that Caribbean states, along with Pacific and African countries
whose economies would also be affected, were limited to the role of interested third
parties, and were not principal disputants. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, World Trade Organization Agreement, Annex 2,
art. 10, 33 I.L.M. 1130 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding],
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf. Several CARICOM Member
States were named third parties to the dispute. See Key European Comminuties-
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fight against drug trafficking 65 brought home the comparative
ineffectiveness of the islands' exercise of sovereignty.66
If one analogizes the attributes of sovereignty to the proverbial
"bundle" of property rights, the Caribbean island states retain the
aspects of sovereignty arising from the primacy of territoriality,
including the power to confer or withhold citizenship, 67 to Xpass
and enforce domestic legislation to enforce internal order,' to
Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds27_e.htm (listing Domina,
Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Suriname among the twenty named third
parties). Although Article 10, paragraph 4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
provides that:
if a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel
proceedings nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered
agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal dispute settlement
procedures under this Understanding...
and that "[s]uch a dispute shall be referred to the original panel wherever possible."
None of the CARICOM Member States nor the other African-Caribbean-Pacific
countries have requested separate consultations addressing the impact of the Banana
Dispute on their economies. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-subjects
_indexe.htm (follow "bananas" hyperlink) (showing that none of the aforementioned
countries have requested consultations regarding the subject of bananas).
65 See Clarke, supra note 15 (describing the Shiprider Agreements).
66 It may be true, however, that in this era of globalization, even developed
countries are not absolute masters of their destiny. In particular, the movements of
capital and corporate international activities appear to have escaped nation-state control.
See, e.g., Clive Y. Thomas, Caribbean Economic Integration: Challenges and the Way
Forward, THE INTEGRATIONIST, July 2002, at 20, 21 ("Thus in recent years we have
witnessed a situation in [developed] countries in which 1) large corporations and
financial institutions are able to control funds and resources on such a scale, and 2) the
simultaneous promotion of mass instantaneous cross-border communications, that these
factors have combined to reduce the capacity of their National Authorities to control or
limit them." (emphasis added)); see also Henkin, supra note 44, at 6-7:
There is growing, though grudging, realization that world economic affairs,
world communications, and ... world politics, are no longer cabined within the
state system. And suddenly, or perhaps slowly, the realization is sinking in that
sovereignty has lost its nerve, and sovereign states have realized that they are
losing their control, that the state system is losing control.
67 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations explains the
mechanisms through which an individual is entitled to or may acquire citizenship of the
United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §212 (1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §213 (1987) (regarding the conferral of
citizenship by states).
68 JOSEPH CAMILLERI ET AL., THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY 17-18 (1992).
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raise an army,69 and to issue currency. Other externally directed
threads of the bundle are more frayed, conveying little power to
affect the fate of the island states, such as the right to refuse to
accept "deportees"-long-gone citizens expelled from the United
States-for criminal activities, to police their territorial waters for
drug smugglers and illegal fishing activity, to intervene in the
chaotic political turmoil of a neighboring state,70 and to control
their economic future without direction from outsiders.
Louis Henkin's observations on the effects of the myth of
sovereignty are particularly apt in the context of Caribbean
regional integration:
Cooperation by "sovereign" states did not come easily, and it
continues to be difficult. I blame the delusions and mythology
of sovereignty for the failure of states to collaborate more
extensively. Sovereignty does not encourage cooperation; it
breeds "going it alone." We have had some cooperation, but
it has been limited in the name of sovereignty.., limited, not
only in achievement but even in aspiration, by a persistent
addiction to this notion of sovereignty.7
Caribbean academics and politicians have pointed out the
hurdle presented by the region's concept of sovereignty and urged
that it be overcome. For example, Professor Vaughan Lewis72
discusses the region's failure to develop a system of supranational
regional governance, while noting that notions of sovereignty are
more difficult to hold onto within the Caribbean:
This [supranational] notion of governance has tended to be
resisted in the Caribbean region, as a result of strongly held
notions of sovereignty over difference [sic] spheres of
government, even as in many of the larger states of the region
it is difficult, after the ravages of recession, to identify
meaningful areas of autonomy in decision-making.73
Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados, has noted that the
69 See Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 273
(2004).
70 The unrest in Haiti is an example.
71 Henkin, supra note 44, at 3 (emphasis added).
72 Professor Lewis is the head of the Institute of International Relations, University
of the West Indies, located in St. Augustine, Trinidad.
73 Lewis, supra note 56, at 342.
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success of the CSME will depend on a change in the way the
regional integration endeavour is structured:
[the Caribbean] conceives of (itself) mainly as a community of
sovereign states in which sovereignty is pooled but never ceded;
with the nation-state being the locus of decision-making in
respect of the implementation of regional commitments.74
The reluctance to concede that sovereignty is evident in the
institutional structure and framework of the Community.75
Even if full integration were achieved, the real scope of the
pooled sovereignty of the regional grouping would perhaps not
attain the mythical characteristics desired by its members. A
group of fifteen relatively small states with a total population of 14
million creates only a comparatively small market with limited
influence in the global community.76
D. Aspirational Economic Integration
"Economic integration" as used in this paper evokes the
integration achieved through the creation of a single economic
space-federal systems such as Canada or the United States-or
that toward which the European Union has made significant
strides." The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is a
principal goal of CARICOM. 78 However, in the Caribbean (and
CARICOM) context, such deep and broad integration remains
"aspirational," an ideal invoked in speeches, treaties and
conferences, but toward which only halting progress has been
74 See David Jessop, Caribbean Should Follow EU's Lead, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/html
/20031220t220000-0500_53290_obs_caribbeanshould follow_eu_s_lead.asp (quoting
Prime Minister Owen Arthur) (emphasis added).
75 See infra Part V for detailed discussion.
76 Also worth asking is the question: Does separate sovereignty lead to greater
flexibility, nimbleness, and experimentation in reaction to future crises, giving the
Member States the ability to react more swiftly to such crises? This question, beyond the
scope of this Article, may be explored elsewhere.
77 See, e.g., Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for
Economic Integration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139,
142 (2003).
78 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25. The second paragraph of the Preamble





Aspirational economic integration in the Caribbean is
characterized by: (1) maintenance of Member State governmental
control of desired integration; (2) the refusal to concede
meaningful aspects of state sovereignty to facilitate the purposes
of the regional organization; (3) the absence from constitutive
documents of the regional organization of the basic minima
necessary for economic integration;8 ° (4) the failure to create a
supranational body with the power to drive the integration process;
(5) creation of a decision-making procedure that facilitates
deadlock and halting progress; (6) a weak enforcement mechanism
that favors delay and non-implementation; and (7) lack of
meaningful involvement of the Member States in the integration
process.
All of the foregoing characteristics are manifested in the
CARICOM model of economic integration.
IV. CARICOM: Why, When, How
The West Indian Federation was a failed experiment in
political integration imposed by the United Kingdom on its former
colonies as they crept toward independence. 8' From its ashes were
created the Caribbean Free Trade Association82 and its successor,
CARICOM. 83 The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the
79 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1. For example, while the Revised Treaty terms
refer to a single market, they maintain the barriers between Member States that are no
different from the 1973 Treaty's Common Market. See Brewster, supra note 16.
80 For example, in the Caribbean context, the freedom of movement of labor, a
fundamental unit of production, is limited. See infra Part VI for discussion.
81 See Mullerleile, supra note 50, for background on the formation of the
Federation, and the political and social trends that lead to its creation and collapse;
see also Menon, supra note 53, at 88-93 ("The federation was something of a tour
de force; it was imposed externally 'as a primary means of advancing metropolitan
colonial goals rather than assisting its West Indies colonies to achieve viable independent
nationhood .... ') (footnotes omitted; quoting W. Marvin Will, A Nation Divided: The
Quest for Caribbean Integration, 26 (2) LAT. AM. REs. REv., 3, 10 (1991)).
82 The Dickenson Bay Agreement (1965) among Antigua, Guyana (then British
Guiana), and Barbados established the Caribbean Free Trade Association. See
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, reprinted in Pollard,
supra note 8, at 51.
83 The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas was spearheaded by regional political leaders.
See Pollard, supra note 8, at 6.
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Caribbean Community and Common Market was executed at
Chaguaramas, Trinidad, on July 4, 1973 and came into force on
August 1, 1973.84 Recognizing the limitations of the small size
and underdevelopment of the former British colonies, the aim of
the founders of the Community was to create a forum for
integration for the English-speaking Caribbean countries. With
the memberships of Suriname and Haiti, the Community created a
natural market of 14 million people.86
A. 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas
The Preamble to the 1973 Treaty87 evokes the consolidation
and strengthening of the historic bonds among the peoples of the
contracting states, the people's hopes and aspirations for full
employment and improved standards of living, the consciousness
that those objectives could be best achieved through accelerated
and sustained economic activity, and awareness of the need to
design an effective regime to achieve those goals. Article 4 of the
treaty states the three main objectives (or pillars) of the
Community: (1) economic integration; (2) foreign policy
coordination; and (3) functional co-operation. The most fully
elaborated of these is economic integration.88 The desired benefits
of integration include both: (1) the elimination of duplicative
governance and bureaucratic systems and (2) accelerated
84 See 1973 Treaty, supra note 11.
85 See Trevor Farrell, Five Major Problems for CARICOM in BEYOND SURVIVAL,
supra note 15, at 8, 11-12.
86 Edwin W. Carrington, Secretary General of the Caribbean Community, U.S. &
Caribbean Trade Linkages: Fostering Partnerships For the 21st Century (Apr. 22, 1999),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/speechl.htm. This may be contrasted to the size of
the market created by the formation of the European Community and later European
Union, which expanded to 470 million citizens upon the accession of 10 new members
on May 1, 2004. Marian L. Tupy, EU Enlargement Cost, Benefit, and Strategies for
Central and Eastern European Countries, 489 POL'Y ANALYSIS 2 (Sept. 18, 2003),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa489.pdf.
87 Although the 1973 Treaty will be superseded by the Revised Treaty upon
ratification by the required number of states, the Preamble and some other aspects of the
1973 Treaty will be discussed as they form the kernel for goals of the Community,
embodying the aspirations of the Member States. Further, as the Revised Treaty has not
yet been ratified, while the Member States of the Community work toward its
implementation, both treaties merit consideration and analysis.
88 See 1973 Treaty, supra note 11, art. 4(a)(i)-(iii).
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economic development through increased intra-regional and
external trade, via greater competitiveness of local producers and
service providers vis-a-vis the rest of the world.89
The structure of CARICOM and its division into Community
and Common Market,90 however, reveals a historic lack of
consensus among the Member States. 9' The separation into these
two somewhat symbiotic entities was meant to facilitate the
accession to membership in the Community by both those
countries who were prepared to participate in the Common Market
and those who were not.92 However, membership in the Common
Market was made contingent on participation in the Community,93
thus creating an incentive to join CARICOM and decreasing the
opportunity to free-ride by joining the Common Market only.94
In reaction to fundamental and wide-ranging developments on
the international scene, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the creation of the European Union, the leadership of
CARICOM realized that the organization needed to re-position
and re-constitute itself if it were to be a true agent for Caribbean
development through integration. 9
In 1991, the West Indian Commission was "established by the
CARICOM heads of Government to help the people of the West
Indies prepare for the twenty-first century. 96 Constituted as an
independent body, the Commission was charged with formulating
proposals to further the goals of the 1973 Treaty and to submit its
89 The increase in the market available to local manufacturers is expected to make
them more efficient through economies of scale, and thus more competitive in relation to
external producers. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 22.
90 The Community's role was to fulfill the functional and foreign policy
coordination goals of the 1973 Treaty, while the Common Market would drive the
economic integration of the Member States.
91 Pollard, supra note 8, at 6.
92 Id. at 7.
93 Id. at 6-8.
94 There were indications that Jamaica was more interested in the economic
potential of the Common Market than in being a member of the Community. However,
due to the linked structure, only The Bahamas chose to join the Community, but not the
Common Market. Id. at 7.
95 Id. at 21-22; see also Blake, supra note 22.
96 THE WEST INDIAN COMM'N, TIME FOR ACTION: REP. OF THE WEST INDIAN
COMM'N 4 (1992) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
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report to the July 1992 Heads of Government meeting. 97 In 1992,
following well-documented consultations with people and
institutions throughout the Caribbean and among the West Indian
diaspora in the United States and United Kingdom, the
Commission issued six key recommendations for adoption and
guidance for the Community.98 The recommendations were
summarized as follows:
1. Permit West Indians to travel in their Region with the
freedom and ease due to them as citizens of a nation common
to all-and encourage exchange visits, especially among
young people.
2. Allow West Indian graduates of UW199 (and other institutions
to be identified) and media people to work and live freely
anywhere in the Region as a first step to permitting the free
movement of skilled people within the Region.
3. Take the first concrete steps-which the Progress Report
defined-towards establishing an independent Caribbean
Monetary Authority and a common currency.
4. Launch a Caribbean Investment Fund of US$50-70 million to
invest in the Region's stock markets. The Progress Report set
out a specific proposal for launching the Fund.
5. Complete as a matter of urgency-and setting aside all
delaying argument-the CARICOM Single Market with its
three principal instruments: the Common External Tariff, the
Harmonized Scheme of Fiscal Incentives, and the Rules of
Origin.
6. Mobilize CARICOM to have a single negotiating posture and
a single voice for international negotiations vital to our
common interests.' 00
However, although those principal recommendations were
timely accepted for action,"1 domestic implementation of the
necessary foundations of economic integration still lags.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 The University of the West Indies.
100 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 96, at 6 (emphasis added). According to the





B. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas - 2001
Arising directly from the Recommendations of the
Commission and the Heads of Government agreement to revise
the 1973 Treaty, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas ("Revised
Treaty") was born in 2001, aimed at radically transforming
CARICOM as an institution by fusing "the political and economic
dimensions of the Caribbean Community and Common Market"'1 2
with "a fundamental transformation and restructuring of the
Caribbean Community from a conservative, inward-looking,
protectionist, functionally constrained organisation to an open
liberalised, efficient, internationally competitive, outward-looking
and deliberately flexible institution.' 0 3
The Preamble to the Revised Treaty is a sprawling affair,
focused on macroeconomic visions and encompassing such wide-
ranging issues as, among other things, the international
competitiveness demanded by the process of globalization; the
need to enhance the participation of the Caribbean people 04 and
social partners; the requirement of "structured integration of
production[s]" and free movement of capital, labor, and
technology for optimal performance by Caribbean enterprises; and
the need for joint action with respect to international and
intraregional trade.'0 5 The Revised Treaty expands the objectives
of the Community, maintaining the Member States' economic
development focus,'0 6 while the Community is re-structured to
eliminate the separate though symbiotic legal existence of the
Community and the Common Market into a unitary entity.0 7
Although integration efforts in spheres, such as education and
102 Pollard, supra note 8, at 23.
103 Id. at 459. However, three years later the Revised Treaty had not yet
entered into force, as the Community awaited Montserrat's ratification. See Senate
Passes Bill to Repeal Common Market Act, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER INTERNET
EDITION, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040330t200000-0500_57906
_obs-senate-passes-.bill-to-repeal commonmarketact.asp. By its terms the Treaty
will enter into force upon ratification and deposit with the Secretariat by all Member
States. See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 233-34.
104 But see infra Part VI for discussion.
105 See generally Revised Treaty, supra note 25, Preamble.
106 See id. at art. 6 (a)-(g).
107 See id. at art. 1 ("'Community' means the Caribbean Community established by
Article 2 and includes the CSME established by the provisions of this Treaty.").
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health have been successful, CARICOM appears to have failed in
its economic integration attempts. 10 8  Throughout CARICOM's
thirty-year history, intra-Community trade has failed to increase
substantially.0 9 Moreover, the much-heralded CSME is still not a
reality, as several of the CARICOM Member States have not
implemented the requisite domestic legislation."' This failure
defies the Revised Treaty's General Undertaking on
Implementation clause.'11 In addition, one may debate whether the
mechanisms adopted in furtherance of creating the CSME are
adequate to the task of fulfilling the drafters' apparent
108 For example, the venerable University of the West Indies system has been
gathered under CARICOM's auspices and the Caribbean Examination Council
successfully introduced the CXC exam, a Caribbean-wide high school certification that
is accepted and well regarded in tertiary institutions throughout the world. See Pollard,
supra note 8, at 19, 144.
109 See, e.g., Anthony Gonzales, Caribbean Integration in the Next Decade: A
Strategic Vision for the New Millennium, in BEYOND SURVIVAL, supra note 15, at 631;
see also Brewster, supra note 16 ("[A]fter 30 years of the Community's existence, intra-
regional exports amount (in 2000) to only 28 percent of total regional exports, having
increased from 11.5 percent in 1990."). See also Prof. Compton Bourne, President
Caribbean Dev. Bank, a Caribbean Community for All, Lecture in the Distinguished
Lecture Series: Celebrating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Caribbean Community (June
25, 2003), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/regional-issues/30anniversarylecture
5-boume.pdf.
110 See Rickey Singh, Hot Political Agenda Awaits Caricom Heads, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER INTERNET EDITION, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/html/
20040320t200000-0500_57421_obs hoLpoliticaLagenda.awaits caricomheads.asp. ("It is
also my understanding that, for all their rhetoric about 'advancing arrangements' a
number of community governments are yet to introduce the relevant legislation in their
parliament to help make the CSME a reality."). Singh also describes trade-related
tensions between Member States Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago. The delay is not
new. See, e.g., RE-INVENTING CARICOM: THE ROAD TO A NEW INTEGRATION 298-99
(Kenneth Hall ed., 2d ed. 2003) (noting that while the "CSME is now a major pre-
occupation of CARICOM" the deadline for implementation continues to be pushed
backward and more than a decade after the Community's determination to create the
CSME, it was still not a reality).
111 See the Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 9.
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure the carrying out of obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from decisions taken by the Organs and Bodies of the Community.
They shall facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Community. They
shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the
objectives of this Treaty.
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aspirations.' 12
The formation of the Regional Negotiation Machinery
(RNM)1 3 has brought some coherence to the international
relations of the Member States. The RNM has taken the lead in
FTAA and WTO negotiations, as well as bilateral negotiations
with potential Community partners. 14  Nevertheless, on the
coordination of the foreign relations front, in 2004 CARICOM
failed in its efforts to stimulate a U.N.-led multilateral intervention
in Haiti, as that Member State devolved into its latest political
crisis.",5
Does the comparatively small size of the CARICOM market
create an insurmountable obstacle to integration and effective
economic development? Given the similarity of the goods and
services produced in the islands, there is a fundamental question
whether the Caribbean nation states create a natural market for
each others' goods and services. It may be argued that this reality
is a flaw at the center of the CSME, an argument that has, in part,
stimulated the attempts to widen the engagement of the
Community with other Caribbean countries. For example, the
original membership of formerly British colonies has been
widened to include Suriname and Haiti, neither of which are
English-speaking; in addition, the Community was an integral
112 For example, the Revised Treaty provides for only limited free movement of the
Member States' citizens. See infra Part VI for discussion.
113 The RNM is headed by a Chief Negotiator, whose team collaborates with the
CARICOM administration. The machinery collaborates with the Community structures,
and provides a group of negotiators for each negotiation in which the Community is
involved. See Arnold McIntyre, The Caribbean Community and External Negotiations
in BEYOND SURVIVAL, supra note 15, at 681, 685.
114 See Christopher P. Malcolm, Caribbean Integration within the CARICOM
Framework: The Socio-Historical, Economic, and Political Dynamics of a Regional
response to a Global Phenomenon, 10 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 35 (2004).
115 See, e.g., Aristide Visit Triggers Row, supra note 6. The United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which arrived some time after Aristide's
departure, will, with the addition of a further 1,000 peacekeepers authorized by the UN
Security Council, number 8,500. See UN Peacekeeping Chief: Haiti Worse Than
Darfur, HAITI NEWS, http://www.haiti-news.com/article.php3?id -article=3819. Despite
the presence of the troops, the situation in Haiti continues to deteriorate. See Haiti
Leader Asks for Tougher UN Peacekeeping Mandate, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, June 7,
2005, http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-o5-07voal l0.cfm. See also Ginger
Thompson, A New Scourge Afflicts Haiti: Kidnappings, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2005, at Al,
http://www.nytimes.corn2005/06/06/intemational/americas/O6haiti.html.
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player at the forefront of stimulating the formation of the
Association of Caribbean States (ACS), whose purpose is to
increase cooperation and coordination in the Caribbean basin-as
compared to CARICOM's push toward integration.' 
16
Other significant challenges include: the geographical
dispersal and the non-contiguity of the Member States, the poverty
and underdevelopment of the Member States, and the disparity in
geographic and population sizes of the Member States, with the
attendant fears that smaller Member States will be overwhelmed
by the more economically dominant ones. 117  In addition, the
question of whether economic integration, in and of itself, will
bring the development benefits that are expected of it remains
unanswered.
Given acknowledgement of the challenges faced by the
Caribbean states, 118 questions remain whether the economic
integration of the Community has been delayed by a dearth of
imagination on the part of its leaders, who dared not go to where
their people begged them."9 Was it the fear of taking the bold
steps that would have demanded the concession of some part of
sovereignty to be pooled to create a locus of strength in the
region? 120  The most immediate challenges now faced by the
organization are created by the constraints and opportunities posed
by globalization and the forced liberalization of markets with its
116 See Convention Establishing Association of Caribbean States, Preamble,
http://www.acs-aec.org/convention.htm#PREAMBLE. The membership of the ACS
includes the CARICOM Member States as well as all the countries (other than the
United States) whose shores are washed by the Caribbean sea. This includes, Colombia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, the Netherlands Antilles, and El Salvador; while
associate membership is available to non-independent entities (such as Anguilla and
Montserrat) in the Caribbean Basin. See id. Annex II.
117 Antigua-Barbuda Pushes for Special Treatment for OECS States, CARIB. NET
NEWS, July 6, 2005, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2005/pushes.shtml.
118 See supra Introduction.
119 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 96, at 11-17 (discussing widespread
support for greater regional integration among the Commission's respondents and
interviewees).
120 That the island nations' closely guarded sovereignty is more mythic than real is
exemplified by the Shiprider Agreements, Clarke, supra note 15, and accompanying text,
as well as CARICOM's inability to invite Cuba to join the Community. See Michael
Wallace Gordon, The Wild Card in the Caribbean-Cuba, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM.
278, 287-88 (1999).
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attendant dislocations. These challenges are embodied in the
opportunities and risks presented by the United States' proposal
for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (the FTAA), in which both
CARICOM and the ACS participate, and the sub-regional trading
agreements that the United States has spearheaded as an
alternative to the stalled FTAA negotiations.
121
After fifteen years of delay, the CSME was finally scheduled
for launch in January 2005,122 but was re-scheduled for January 1,
2006.123 Some regional commentators presciently expressed doubt
that the January 1, 2006, launch would take place, pointing to
delays such as the upheaval caused in the region by the
devastating 2004 hurricane season. 12' The Member States appear
to be committed to the launch, and have undertaken measures 125 to
bring the CSME to fruition. Despite that public show of
commitment, several fundamental prerequisites remain to be
implemented. For example, the Revised Treaty applies to only ten
of the fifteen Member States; 126 the Bahamas has entered a
121 The FTAA negotiations appear to be stalled. Begun in 1994, negotiations have
continued over the past 10 years, with a stated deadline of January 2005. However, the
differences in negotiating positions appear to have increased instead of declining over
the 11-year negotiation period. See Global Exchange FTAA Frequently Asked
Questions: What Is the Current Status of the FTAA Negotiations?, Apr. 1, 2005,
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ftaa/faq.html#1. The Central American Free
Trade Area Agreement (CAFTA), signed by the United States, the Dominican
Republic, and certain Central American countries, was approved by the United States
Congress in July 2005. The United States is also pursuing regional agreements with the
sub-regional Andean Group, with the latest round of negotiations taking place in
Miami during July 2005. See Negotiators Arrive in Miami for U.S.-Andean Trade Talks,
S. FLA. Bus. J., July 20, 2005, http://www.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2005/
07/18/daily45.html?from rss=1.
122 See Singh, supra note 17.
123 See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, CARICOM NEWS,
http://www.jis.gov.jm/specialsections/CARICOMNew/CSME1 .html.
124 Id. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom has
since found unconstitutional the legislation enacted by Jamaica to institute the Caribbean
Court of Justice. See infra note 230.
125 Including the ratification of the Revised Treaty by all Member States other than
Dominca. See Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary
of Status of Key Elements, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/
csmekeyelements.pdf.
126 Id. at 1.
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reservation with respect to the CSME;,2 7 and discriminatory
barriers to the movement of goods, services, and people have not
been removed from the domestic laws of the Member States. 128
V. The Many-Headed Hydra
The privilege of sovereignty, and efforts to guard it, have led
to the construction of an organizational structure lacking in
cohesion and supranational scope, bereft of ability or power to
enforce Member State implementation of the common market. A
striking feature of the CARICOM structure is the deliberate
diffusion of authority and competence 129 among a multiplicity of
Organs, Bodies, Institutions, and Associate Institutions. 3 ° This
system suffers from a weak dispute settlement mechanism and the
foreclosure of participation by citizens of the Community.
Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados, clearly describes
the viewpoint that underlies the institutional structure of
CARICOM,
The institutional, the legal and the economic instruments that
gave effect to the CSME13 ' have ... been designed to take effect
through intra-governmental cooperation of a kind that avoids
any infringement of national sovereignty. 132
The institutional design of CARICOM has a number of
consequences. For example, the diluted power of the Community
organizational structure, including the decentralization of
decision-making authority within the organization and the
husbanding of initiative within the Heads of Government
Conference, means that the institutional structure undermines its
effectiveness. Since the functional consequences of the chosen
127 See Pollard, supra note 8, at 460.
128 Id. Indeed the October 2004 table issued by the Secretariat reveals that in
virtually none of the categories listed have all Member States undertaken the domestic
legislative implementation required to create the single economic space (the much-
vaunted CSME).
129 The term "competence" is used here to refer to the jurisdiction to act within a
specific sphere.
130 The Revised Treaty does not explain the meaning or import of the distinctions
among Organs, Bodies, Institutions, and Associate Institutions.
131 And, I posit, the Community as a whole.
132 Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados (emphasis added). See Jessop, supra
note 74.
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structure are clear, and the Member States had some eighteen
years of experience of working together under the 1973 Treaty at
the time of the drafting of the Revised Treaty, the structure clearly
demonstrates a compromise amongst the Member States between
deference to sovereignty and effective implementation of
CARICOM goals. That compromise leans heavily in favor of
deference to Member State conceptions of sovereignty.
While an explicit reference is never made to the European
Union in CARICOM's constitutive documents, its influence is
apparent in some provisions of the Revised Treaty. For example,
Article 214, Referral to the Court, is clearly inspired by Article
234 of the Treaty of European Union, 133 which allows the
domestic courts of Member States of the Union to request
interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of issues of
133 Article 234 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Communities reads:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community and of the ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national
law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 234.
In comparison, Article 214 of the Revised Treaty reads:
Where a national court or tribunal of a Member State is seised of an issue whose
resolution involves a question concerning the interpretation or application of
this Treaty, the court or tribunal concerned shall, if it considers that a decision
on the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, refer the question
to the Court for determination before delivering judgment.
Revised Treaty, supra note 25, at art .214.
However, the mandatory call for referral in the European Union context has been
weakened by the Revised Treaty to give more deference to the national courts. Only
time and experience will reveal whether deference in this case may stem from the
suspicion with which some of the Caribbean population perceives the establishment of
the new court.
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Community law applicable to cases before them. Therefore, it is
not unreasonable to state that the drafters and Member States, after
studying the constitutive documents of the European Union,
rejected that entity's effective organizational choices and chose
provisions 134 with clear disadvantages in the area of functional
effectiveness.
A. Description of Institutional Structure
The Revised Treaty creates two Principal Organs (the
Conference of Heads of Government and the Community Council
of Ministers) and four functional organs (the Council for Finance
and Planning (COFAD), the Council for Trade and Economic
Development (COTED), the Council for Foreign and Community
Relations (COFCOR), and the Council for Human and Social
Development (COHSOD) 3 5 (together, the Ministerial Councils)).
In addition, the Secretariat is the administrative center of the
organization, while there is a plethora of satellite Institutions and
associate Institutions.
1. Organs
a. Heads of Government Conference
i. Composition, Competence and Powers
Composed of the Member States' heads of government, 136 the
Conference of Heads of Government is the "supreme Organ of the
Community"'' 37 with power to determine and provide policy
direction of the Community,138 enter into treaties, establish
Community Organs or Bodies, and make decisions regarding the
financial affairs of the Community. "9 In addition, the Bureau
134 It need not be stated that drafters ought not to slavishly copy the text of
documents used as inspiration for drafting. The point made here is that, rather than
adapting successful features to affect CARICOM's stated goals, the drafters and Member
States rejected them wholesale.
135 Revised Treaty, supra note 24, art. 10. See also arts. 21-23.
136 Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 11, $ 1.
137 Id. art. 12, 1.
138 Id. art. 12, 2.
139 Id. art. 12,[4-6.
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"consisting of the current and immediately outgoing and incoming
Chairmen of the Conference"'4 ° performs additional functions
of giving policy guidance to the Secretariat, facilitating
implementation of Community decisions "updating Member State
guidance and initiating proposals for development and approval by
the Ministerial Councils."''
Figure 1: Functional Relationship of the Organs and Bodies of
the Caribbean Community
142
140 Revised treaty, supra note 25, art. 12, 11. The mechanism for appointment or
election of the chairman of the Conference is not specified in revised treaty, which
reserves to the Conference the power to regulate its own procedure. Id. art. 12, T 10.
141 Id. art. 12, f/ 11.
142 CARICOM, The Community and Common Market: Structure of the
Community, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives/comstrgf.htm.
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ii. Voting
Each Member State has one vote in all Community Organs and
Bodies. 143 Voting in the Conference to create binding decisions is
by unanimity.'" Abstentions do not impair the binding nature of
the procedural validity of the vote, so long as 75% of the
Community membership votes in favor of the decision.
145
b. Community Council of Ministers146
i. Composition and Powers
The Council of Ministers is the second highest organ in the
Community, consisting of Member State ministers responsible for
Community Affairs and any other minister that a Member State
may designate in its discretion. 14' The Council has primary
responsibility for Community strategic planning and for
coordinating the three pillars of the Community-economic
integration, functional cooperation, and external relations. l'8
These responsibilities include the approval of programs emanating
from other Community Organs, and the Council has the power to
amend or request changes to proposals submitted by Ministerial
Councils.'49 The Council also controls budget approval, resource
mobilization, and allocation and serves as a preparatory body for
meetings of the Conference. 5 °  By delegation from the
Conference, the Council issues directives to both the Organs and
the Secretariat, and has further responsibility for the promotion,
enhancement, monitoring, and evaluation of regional and national
implementation processes."'
143 Id. art. 27, 1.
144 Id. art. 28, 1.
145 Id. art. 28, 2.
146 Id. art. 13.
147 Id. art. 13, 11.
148 Id. art. 13,12.
149 Id. art. 13, 3.





i. Composition, Competence, and Function
Each of the following is composed of the national ministers of
Member States responsible for those portfolios within individual
Member States: 2 the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP),
the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the
Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), and the
Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR).153 In
addition, Member States may designate alternate representatives to
each of the Councils. 15 4 The responsibilities of each of the four
Ministerial Councils are primarily the promotion, collaboration,
and coordination of Community Member States with respect to
programs falling under their titles.155 And, in particular, COTED
is responsible for the "promot[ion of] the development and
oversee[ing] the operation of the CSME."' 56
ii. Voting
Voting in the Council of Ministers and in the Ministerial
Councils is by qualified majority-that is, an affirmative vote of
no less than 75% of the Member States157-unless the subject issue
is of "critical importance to the national well-being of a Member
State." 58  In such event, voting must be unanimous.1 59  An
affirmative vote of at least 75% of the Member States is required
to satisfy the qualified majority requirement.160
152 See id. art. 15-17,$ 1.
153 This veritable alphabet soup of acronyms aptly conveys the many-armed and
many-headed Hydra-like organizational structure.
154 Id.
155 See id. art. 15-17.
156 Id. art 15,1 2(a).
157 See id. art. 29, 2.
158 The decision whether a matter is of critical importance to the national well-being
of a Member State "is reached by a two-thirds majority of the Member States." Id. art.
29, 4.
159 Id. art. 29, 3.
160 Id. art. 29, $ 2. The effect of these voting provisions is analyzed and discussed
infra Part V.B.
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2. Bodies, Institutions, and Associate Institutions
a. Community Bodies
The Revised Treaty also creates the Legal Affairs and Budget
Committees and the Committee of Central Bank Governors as
Bodies of the Community, 6' while the Community Organs have
residual power to create additional Bodies as such Organs deem
necessary. 162 Each of the Bodies is composed of officials or, in the
case of the Legal Affairs Committee, ministers appointed to
analogous portfolios in the national affairs of Member States.
163
b. Community Institutions and Associate Institutions
The Institutions and Associate Institutions of the Community
include: the Caribbean Meteorological Institute, the Caribbean
Meteorological Organization, the Association of Caribbean
Community Parliamentarians, 164 all Institutions; 61 the Caribbean
Development Bank; and the Universities of the West Indies and of
Guyana, and the Caribbean Law Institute/Caribbean Law Institute
Centre, all Associate Institutions.
66
The internal functioning, composition, and duties of these
Institutions and Associate Institutions-most of which were
established through separate regional agreements167-are not
discussed in the Revised Treaty. Because of this structure, there is
uncoordinated activity in microspheres of competence. The
monitoring, reporting, and coordination among these entities of
such disparate competences are not specified by the Revised
Treaty.
161 Id. art. 18.
162 Id. art. 18, 3.
163 See id. art. 19.
164 Interestingly, revised treaty appears to misname this body. The true name of the
body is clear from the document that established it: "Agreement for the Establishment of
an Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians" (emphasis added); see also
infra note 251 and accompanying text.
165 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 1.
166 Id. art. 22.
167 See Pollard, supra note 8, passim.
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c. The Secretariat and the Secretary-General
The Secretariat is designated by Article 23 of the Revised
Treaty as the principal administrative organ of the Community,
with headquarters in Georgetown, Guyana.168 The Treaty seeks to
assure the independence of the Secretariat by prohibiting the
Secretariat from taking instructions from Member States or any
external bodies. 169  The Treaty also abjures Member States to
respect the international character of the Secretary-General.17 °
The Secretary-General is appointed by the Heads of
Government Conference for a term of five years, subject to
reappointment. 17' The duties of the Secretariat and Secretary-
General include: representation of the Community, 172 development
for implementation of decisions of competent Community
Organs, 173 implementation of the monitoring of Community
decisions,'74 the initiation or development of proposals for
consideration by competent Community Organs,'75  record-
keeping, 176 fact-finding, 177 and service of meetings of Organs and
Bodies of the Community. 178
B. Analysis
1. Composition, Function and Voting of Institutional
Entities
a. Composition
The Conference of Heads of Government, the Council of
Ministers and the Ministerial Councils, and the Primary and
168 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 23, 1.
169 See id. art. 23, 4.
170 Id. art. 23, 5.
171 Id. art. 24, 1.
172 Id. art. 24, 2(a).
173 Id. art. 24, 2(b).
174 Revised Treaty, supra note 25, 2(f).
175 Id. art. 24, 2(g).
176 Id. art. 25(d).
177 Id. art. 25(i).
178 Id. art. 25(a); see also Pollard, supra note 8, at 889.
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Secondary Organs of the Community are all composed of elected
or appointed officials.'79 The consequences of this composition in
terms of dedication to CARICOM goals and effectiveness are as
follows:
1. As elected or appointed officials in their respective domestic
territories, the members of these organs have the advantage of
more than superficial knowledge in the spheres of competence
to which they are assigned. On the other hand, consciousness
of their elected or appointed positions imparts some
constraints to their activities within the Community. Clearly,
a primary goal is to maintain electoral dominance in the
domestic context, while appointed Ministers must continue to
please the heads of government and political parties that
appointed them.
2. While some functions may necessarily overlap, it is doubtful
that full-time ministers with demanding portfolios have the
time and energy required to direct the successful
implementation of the CARICOM project.
3. Assuming that the Member States are on different electoral
schedules, the membership of the Primary and Secondary
Organs is subject to frequent change. Consequently, the
members of these organizational entities have limited ability
to build up the trust, competence and political compromise
required to effectively initiate and implement proposals for
the implementation of CARICOM economic integration. The
scope of this problem must be multiplied in light of the need
for the Ministerial Councils, the Council of Ministers-and
the Heads of Government with respect to decision making-
to work together and coordinate sometimes overlapping
competences.180
The drafters appear to have recognized the danger posed by the
dispersal of power to act in tandem with the hoarding of decision-
making power in the Community. 81  For example, Article 20,
179 See supra Part V.A.1 (describing: "Heads of Government Conference,"
"Community Council of Ministers" and "Ministerial Councils").
180 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 10, 12.
181 Article 20 of Revised Treaty (Cooperation by Community Organs) and Article
26 (The Consultation Process) attempt to foreclose the difficulties attendant to the rival
competences and powers of Community Organs and Bodies. See id. arts. 20, 1, 26.
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paragraph 1, commands Community Organs to cooperate for the
achievement of Community objectives, 8 2 while paragraphs two
through six outline some broad mechanisms and procedures for
the actualization of such cooperation.'83 The effectiveness of these
broad-brushed attempts to facilitate coordination among the
disparate heads and arms can be assessed only once the Revised
Treaty has been ratified and these provisions come into effect.
In contrast, the European Union, while requiring that the
Council of Ministers and the Commission consult with each other
and "settle by common accord their methods of cooperation,"'84
also lays out in great detail the decision-making185 and co-
decision-making 18 6 procedures that the Commission, the Council,
and the European Parliament must adhere to in legislating. This
mandated mechanism for cooperation and coordination creates an
objective pathway for the functioning of European Union
institutions.
b. Function
The European Council of the European Union is also
composed of the heads of state or government of the Member
States and the president of the Commission.'87 Its principal role is
to provide the long-term policy objectives of the Union and to
resolve political impasses that cannot be settled within the Union's
institutions-that is, the Council of Ministers, the Commission,
and their various divisions.'88 For example, the European Council,
not the Commission, established the criteria for accession by new
Member States.'89
The distancing of the heads of state from the quotidian
administration of the European Union serves to conserve its power
for important decisions, decrease opportunities for political
182 "Community Organs shall cooperate with each other for the achievement of
Community objectives." See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 30, 1.
183 Id. art. 20, n 2-6.
184 See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 218.
185 Id. art. 251.
186 Id. art. 252.
187 Id. art. 203.
188 Id. art. 202.
189 See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 38, 40-42.
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grandstanding by political leaders, and reserve to the Council of
Ministers and the Commission the initiation, administration,
implementation, and enforcement of Union programs and
initiatives. By contrast, the close involvement of the CARICOM
Heads of Government Conference, including the power to decide
quotidian budgetary and other objectives of other Community
organizations,1 90 opens the door for political grandstanding and
lack of coordination at the highest level.
Furthermore, while also featuring a body analogous to the
heads of government conference the European Council and
Council of Ministers, the European Union has delegated to the
Commission the competences assigned by the Revised Treaty to
the Council of Ministers and the Ministerial Councils.' 9 ' The
Commission is composed of one Commissioner from each
Member State,' 92 who is assigned on a full-time basis for a period
of five years.193 The European Commission is a nerve center for
Union initiatives and implementation. Each Commissioner has
made an "undertaking" to uphold the objectives of the Union.' 94
The dangers of lack of desire or inability to commit to Community
goals are eliminated,' 95 as are the issues of trust and inability to
work together to affect Community goals in a timely fashion. 196
The ability to build up an institutional knowledge base is further
enhanced by the civil servants who are permanently employed by
the Commission.
In the Community, the CARICOM Secretariat is meant to
fulfill some of the roles of the European Commission. However, it
is clear from a comparison of the powers, duties, and
responsibilities assigned to these two bodies that the Secretariat
does not have the heft of the Commission. The Secretariat may
190 Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 12.
191 See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 211; see also Revised Treaty, supra
note 25, art. 10, 13.
192 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 213.
193 Id. art. 214.
194 Id. art. 213.
195 A Commissioner may not engage in any other employment during the term of
his appointment. Id. art. 212.
196 Barring death, resignation, etc., each group of Commissioners will work together
for a five-year period. Id. art. 214. The finite term of office serves to prevent the
ossification of ideas and entrenchment of power within the Commission.
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not propose and adopt regulations affecting Community goals, and
it is positioned as a resource rather than an implementing
organization.197  It is worth noting that the West Indies
Commission, in the 1992 Commission Report, 198 recommended
the creation of a Caribbean Commission with some of the
attributes of the European Commission. This recommendation has
not been adopted in the Revised Treaty. 99
The starkest contrast between CARICOM and the European
Union is that between the European Union's Council of Ministers
and European Commission and the respective Ministerial Councils
and Secretariat of the Community. The Community's broad
distribution of competences must be contrasted to the cohesive
approach of the European Commission, where Commissioners,
representing individual Member States, are assigned primary
responsibility for portfolios. 20  A single Commissioner is unable
to act on his or her own, and stated procedural rules require
decision to be made as a body.21 This organizational structure
facilitates the building of institutional competence, as well as
ensures that the Commission as a body is knowledgeable about
proposals and other European Community actions that may have
consequences for more than one sphere. The Commission is thus
able to handle such issues internally, referring only issues on
which they reach impasse to the Council of Ministers for political
horse-trading and compromise.
c. Voting
Duke Pollard, legal adviser to the CARICOM Secretariat,
notes:
The Caribbean Community, despite its misleading
nomenclature, is an association of sovereign states . . . . [T]he
retention of the unanimity rule in voting procedures of the
197 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 23.
198 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
199 See Peter Wickham, More Shadow than Substance, CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS, July-
Aug. 1994, at 38, reprinted in BEYOND SURVIVAL, supra note 15, at 234 (explaining
some criticisms of the West Indian Commission and its recommendations, including
discussion of the perceived difficulty of adopting the recommendations to create a
CARICOM Commission).
200 See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, arts. 211-219.
201 Id. art. 219.
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Conference, the highest decision-making body, is intended to
emphasize the principle of sovereign equality of states and to
scotch in the bud any lingering disposition at political
integration. 2
0 2
However, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas has boldly
eliminated the unanimity requirement of the 1973 Treaty,0 3
evincing an intent to streamline Community decision-making and
implementation. 204 This is a welcome move which is undercut by
the ability of individual Member States to opt out of Community
obligations.2 °5
The Community has declined to adopt the qualified majority
voting of the European Union,20 6 where Member States are
assigned weighted votes based on population size.20 7 This is a
wise compromise between both the sensitivities of Caribbean
Member States to the relinquishment of sovereignty, and the
rational fears of smaller Member States that they would always be
outvoted by their more populous neighbors. On the other hand,
through the mechanism of the opt-out provision, smaller Member
States would probably be able to reject obligations perceived as
detrimental to their interests. However, the ability of some
Member States to avoid Community obligations will have a
negative impact on the compliance and implementation incentives
of other Member States. 208
While the composition, functions, and voting mechanisms of
the Community, while largely and positively reformed by the
Revised Treaty, manifest inherent flaws that will have a negative
202 Pollard, supra note 8, at 460.
203 See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text; see also David S. Berry, supra
note 24, at 16-17.
204 Id. at 16-17.
205 Revised treaty, supra note 25, art. 27, 4 ("Subject to the agreement of the
Conference, a Member State may opt out of obligations arising from the decisions of
competent Organs provided that the fundamental objectives of the Community, as laid
down in the Treaty, are not prejudiced thereby."). See Berry, supra note 24, at 16
(discussing the possible consequences of allowing a Member State to opt out).
206 See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 190.
207 Each CARICOM Member State has one vote in the proceedings of the Heads of
Government Conference and the Primary and Secondary Organs. See Revised Treaty,
supra note 25, art. 27, 1.
208 See Berry, supra note 24.
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effect on the effectiveness of the Community. To the extent that
positive reforms of the 1973 Treaty have been made, the
Community and its leaders should be heralded. However, the
compromise decision to take a partial plunge toward a truly
supranational organization will ill-serve the implementation of the
CSME, because CARICOM, as a regional body, still lacks the
ability to compel Member States to implement Community
programs.
VI. Flawed Dispute Settlement; Absence of Popular
Participation
In comparison with analogous provisions of the 1973 Treaty,
the dispute resolution and enforcement provisions of the Revised
Treaty reflect a bold step by the Community. Nevertheless, the
mechanisms for resolving disputes between Member States, the
means of enforcing Member State obligations to the constitutive
documents, and the role of citizens in the integration process
illuminate the aspirational nature of the region's economic
integration project.
A. Dispute Settlement and Enforcement
Chapter Nine (Articles 187-224) of the Revised Treaty creates
a dispute settlement regime that appears to be extremely
deferential to the sovereignty of CARICOM Member States:
(1) The nature of disputes covered by the provisions includes
failure to implement the objectives of the Community or
adoption of measures that would frustrate its purposes.209 Six
modes of dispute resolution are named210 and described in some
detail. 211 Disputing Member States have the option of choosing
any of the named alternatives as the desired method of dispute
resolution,212 and the Revised Treaty appears to contemplate that
a dispute may progress through each type of dispute settlement,
209 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 187(a) ("[A]llegations that an actual or
proposed measure of another Member State is, or would be, inconsistent with the
objectives of the Community."); Id. art. 187(d) ("[A]llegations that the purpose or object
of the Treaty is being frustrated or prejudiced.").
210 Id. art. 188, 1 1 ("[G]ood offices, mediation, consultations, conciliation, arbitration,
and adjudication.").
211 Id. arts. 191-207.
212 Id. arts. 189, 190.
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starting with good offices and finally concluding in
adjudication.213
In tandem with the opt-out provisions discussed in Part V(B),
the stage-by-stage dispute settlement mechanism that the Revised
Treaty provides will facilitate Member State non-compliance. If a
Member State does not choose to opt out, it may nevertheless
delay implementation of its obligations under the Revised Treaty
while the dispute, advances through the stages of attempted
resolution laid out by the Revised Treaty's dispute resolution
provisions.
(2) Adjudication under the Revised Treaty is reserved to the
jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ or Caribbean
Court),21 4 established under a separate agreement between
Member States.215 The composition, jurisdiction, functioning,
and powers of the court are outlined in that Agreement,216 and
the CARICOM Member States expressly acknowledge the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in the Revised Treaty.217
The Caribbean Court, which will function both as the court of
final appeal for the CARICOM Member States' domestic courts of
general jurisdiction and the judicial organ of the Community-that
is, adjudicator of disputes under the Revised Treaty218-was
scheduled for launch in November of 2004.219 The CCJ has
original jurisdiction of disputes arising from the Revised Treaty
and will also replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
213 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 199 2, 192 2, 193 T 9.
214 Id. art. 1 ("'Court' means the Caribbean Court of Justice established by the
Agreement.").
215 See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter
CCJ AGREEMENT], reprinted in Pollard, supra note 8, at 441. See generally Sheldon A.
McDonald, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of International
Organizations, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 930 (2004). For a discussion of the issues raised
by the proposed creation of the Court, in particular with respect to its appellate
jurisdiction in cases arising under the domestic laws of Member States, see generally
Stephen Vasciannie, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Further Reflections on the Debate,
23 WEST INDIAN L.J. 37 (1998).
216 See CCJ AGREEMENT, supra note 215.
217 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 216.
218 See CCJ AGREEMENT, supra note 215, art. III, 1 1. For detailed discussion and
analysis of the Court, its constitution and jurisdiction, see generally McDonald, supra
note 215.
219 The launch was delayed until the first quarter of 2005. See Singh, supra note 17.
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of the United Kingdom's House of Lords as the court of final
appeal with general jurisdiction in the Member States.
The CCJ was finally launched on April 16, 2005.220 By the
end of 2004, the Member States had accomplished much of the
joint preparatory work required for that launch, including the
appointment of the President of the Court and the selection by the
competent Community organization-that is, the Regional Judicial
and Legal Services Commission-of six of the nine judges221
provided for by the treaty establishing the Court.222 However,
some of the Member States have not yet transposed their
obligations under the CCJ Agreement into domestic law.223
Although the CCJ was successfully launched as the judicial
body with original jurisdiction of disputes under the Revised
Treaty, its other functions have not been implemented as
successfully. Of the fifteen CARICOM Member States, only
Barbados and Guyana have passed domestic implementing
legislation that allows the Caribbean Court to be the court of final
appeal for domestic, civil, and criminal matters. The other
Member States continued to be mired in internal political dispute,
as exemplified by the successful constitutional challenge by the
Jamaican opposition party.224
While the Community's relatively efficient activities with
respect to the implementation of the Court would appear to
evidence a greater thrust toward regional integration. Ironically,
that implementation may stem from the Member States' jealousy
of their sovereignty and the exercise of that sovereignty. The
institution of a regional court was first put forward as early as
1947,225 and there had been various calls for the formation of such
220 See Press Release, CARICOM, supra note 20.
221 See Press Release, Reg'l Jud. & Legal Services Comm., http://www.caricom
.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres 189_04.htm. As of August 1, 2005, there are 7 justices of the
CCJ. See Caribbean Court of Justice, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judge.htm.
222 See CCJ AGREEMENT, supra note 215, art. IV, 1. The number of judges may be
increased by the Heads of Government Conference of the Member States. Id. art. IV,
2.
223 Singh, supra note 17. These include Trinidad and Tobago, the Member State
that will host the Court. Id.
224 See infra note 230.
225 See Pollard, supra note 8, at 435.
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a court in the years following independence from Britain.226
Despite this, the first definitive steps toward the formation and
launch of such a court is relatively recent. Public perception in the
region is that the true impetus behind the implementation of the
regional court is the Privy Council's decision in Pratt and Another
v. Attorney-General of Jamaica2 7 and its later jurisprudence. The
Privy Council found that the imposition of the death penalty in
Jamaica and other CARICOM Member States whose court of
highest appeal continues to be the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council violated the rights of the appellants. Despite the Member
States' overt limitations in the CCJ Agreement on the influence of
the Member States' governments on the appointment and
independence of judges, legal professionals inside and outside the
region fear that the creation of the Court is actuated by the
Member States' desire to overturn the prohibition against the death
penalty.228
Whether the launch of the Court represents a thrust toward
more effective implementation of the economic integration goals
of the Community or is a mechanism through which the Members
States attempt to hold onto their sovereignty is yet to be
determined. Even if the underlying motive of the Member States
is to protect their sovereignty from the judicial supervision of their
former colonial master, the functioning of the court may undercut
such motive, creating greater integration through the development
of a regional body of law and realizing the avenue for the
adjudication of disputes under the Revised Treaty.
The delay in verification and transposition of the CCJ
Agreement is an example of the barrier to implementation
presented by the dualist heritage of the Commonwealth
Caribbean. 29 The ratification of this treaty and its implementation
226 Id.
227 4 All E.R. 769 (1993). For a summary of the background of the case, and a
discussion of the issues before the Privy Council, see GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE
JUSTICE GAME 93-103 (1999).
228 See, e.g., Vasciannie, supra note 215, at 55-57. By the end of July 2005,
Barbados had brought the first death penalty case before the Caribbean Court. See
Dawne Bennett, Barbados May Take First Death Penalty Case to the CCJ, CARIBBEAN
NET NEWS BARBADOS CORRESPONDENT June 3, 2005, http://www.caribbeannetnews
.com/2005/06/03/cases.shtml.
229 Monist and dualist theories of the interaction of international and domestic law
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into national law remained mired in the domestic political and
legal systems of the Member States.23 ° As such, the relatively
progressive adjudication provisions of the Revised Treaty are
delayed, including the ability of citizens and interested third
parties to enforce Member State obligations under the Revised
Treaty.
In the European Union context, scholars and commentators
attribute much of the success of the integration process to the
European Court of Justice.231 It was the Court's willingness to
declare the supremacy of Union obligations, together with the
direct effect of European Community regulations and directives,232
state, respectively: (1) the international and domestic laws are part of the same system,
such that international treaties and other obligations are directly implemented into
domestic laws without further action by domestic lawmakers (monists), and (2)
international and domestic laws are distinct, such that the domestic lawmakers must
separately adopt the international obligations into domestic law (dualists). See
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 52, at 160.
230 See, e.g., Sobion Raps J'can, T&T Oppositions for Stance on CCJ,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Jan. 23, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/
20040122t210000-050054710_obssobion-raps-j-can t t-oppositionsforstance_
on ccj.asp (describing, in particular, the political grandstanding in Trinidad and Tobago
regarding transposition of the CCJ Agreement into national law, and the reversal of
support by the opposition party following their electoral loss). While the court's
inauguration was scheduled for November 2004, it was later postponed to the first
quarter of 2005. In the meantime, a constitutional challenge against domestic legislation
establishing the court was filed by the Jamaican opposition party. See Singh, supra note
17. On February 3, 2005, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled
unconstitutional the legislation enacted by Jamaica to establish the CCJ. See Press
Release, CARICOM, CARICOM Member States Proceed with Legislative
Harmonisation for Single Market Economy (Feb. 5, 2005), http://www.caricom.org
/jsp/pressreleases/pres29_05.htm; see also Indep. Jam. Council of Hum. Rts. Ltd. v.
Marshall-Burnett & Anor. (Jam.) (UKPC (Feb. 3, 2005). The ruling precipitated intense
negotiations between the Jamaican government and opposition, with the goal of
Jamaican participation in the launch of the Caribbean Court. See Balford Henry,
Gov't, Opposition CCJ Talks Could Start Tomorrow, JAMAICA OBSERVER,
Feb. 9, 2005, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050208T230000-0500-
74798_OBSGOVTOPPOSITIONCCJTALKSCOULDSTARTTOMORROW
.asp. The compromise, reached with so tight a turnaround time that the implementing
domestic legislation was passed only the day before the launch of the Caribbean Court,
created original jurisdiction with respect to matters arising under Revised Treaty, but did
not replace the Privy Council as the court of final appeal in domestic civil and criminal
matters for Jamaica. See Senate OKs CCJ, ZIP LAW, Apr. 16, 2005, http:///www.ziplaw
.com/news/archives/000239.html.
231 See, e.g., BERMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 352-55.
232 See Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964
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and the enforcement action of private parties and individuals
facilitated by Article 234 of the Treaty of European Union,233 that
provided the fuel for Member State implementation and the
inevitability of the integration process.
(3) The dispute settlement provisions of the Revised Treaty
appear to reserve to Member States the ability to use the Revised
Treaty's procedures to enforce Member State implementation.
In other words, the Community, in the form of its Organs or
Bodies (or the Secretariat) is never expressly or implicitly
granted the competence to enforce Member State compliance
with Community obligations. However, Articles 213 and 222
contemplate the participation in adjudication by private parties
through a referral procedure from domestic courts or through
special leave by the Court.
The Revised Treaty provides that decisions of the
Community's Organs are binding on the Member States,234 subject
,to the ability of Member States to opt out.235  Moreover, the
Member States expressly commit in the general undertaking clause
to take positive measures to fulfill obligations arising from the
Revised Treaty, or from the decision of Organs.
236
However, this hopeful picture of Member State commitment
and effective implementation is undercut by Article 240, Saving of
the Revised Treaty, which expressly recognizes that decisions of
Community Organs must be transposed into national law in order
to create legally binding effects.237 The necessity of transposition,
which may vary in form in each Member State, creates built-in
delays to the implementation of Community programs.238
In contrast, the European Court of Justice held that European
ECR 585; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Strato v. Simmenthal S.p.A
1978 ECR 629; BERMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 253-69.
233 See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 234.
234 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 28 1, 29 11.
235 See id. art. 27, 4.
236 See id. art. 9.
237 The dualist legal heritage of the Commonwealth Caribbean requires that
international treaties be transposed into domestic law in order to become part of the
domestic legal system.
238 See, e.g., Sobion Raps J'can, T&T Oppositions for Stance on CCJ, supra note




Community law, in the form of some European Community
directives, regulations, and treaty documents, was supreme within
the Union and regulations of the European Community and some
directives had a direct effect on Member States 9.2 " Therefore, the
binding obligations created by the Union can be enforced by the
Commission, other Member States, and individual citizens.24 °
B. Limited Role of Citizens in the Integration Process
The average Caribbean person knows very little about the
workings of CARICOM and this is a serious indictment on this
West Indian body of eminent men who have managed to
establish what in essence is nothing more than a 'country club'
exclusively designed for their incessant natterings, delectable
social gatherings and inconsequential summits that are best
remembered for what was not achieved.24'
The dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms of the
Revised Treaty, as well as the law-making power of the
Community and the minor role provided for Caribbean citizens,
illustrate the reluctance of Member States and their political
leaders to relinquish the sovereign powers they hold dear to effect
the economic integration to which they avowedly aspire.
The role of citizens in a regional integration process is a
crucial one. The citizens of the Member States have the collective
ability, through the ballot box or demonstrations, to "encourage"
their political leaders to pursue or reject integration.242 The ability
to participate and have a voice in the process, and the provision
made for such voice in the integration project, may therefore serve
as a bellwether for Member State commitment to implementation
and to a democratic process.
239 See Costa, supra note 232. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Strato, supra
note 236.
240 Through the preliminary reference mechanism outlined supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
241 Smith, supra note 1. Irked by the CARICOM failure to meaningfully intervene
in the latest Haitian crisis, Smith questions the relevance of CARICOM in the region's
future. Note that Smith, arguably more knowledgeable about the integration process,
refers to CARICOM as a "West Indian body," and ignores Suriname's and Haiti's
membership in the organization. Id.
242 See, e.g., Bilefsky, supra note 10 (discussing rejection of the proposed European
Union constitution by French and Dutch voters).
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The leaders of the Caribbean regional economic integration
endeavor have avoided meaningful participation by the Caribbean
people. One regional observer24 3 places the blame squarely on the
political leadership's reluctance to allow or facilitate meaningful
interaction by their citizens. "The talk in the streets is that
CARICOM is a toothless mongoose, and much of this
toothlessness has to do with the fact that our respective leaders in
the region have not really embraced their people in the integration
process."
244
On this front, the Revised Treaty appears to be divided. On
the one hand the Revised Treaty appears to open the door for
individual citizen enforcement of obligations and rights created by
the Community, while on the other it virtually forecloses effective
citizen participation in decision-making. As discussed above, the
Revised Treaty, almost certainly inspired by the example of the
European Union, 245 has provided a role to private individuals in
the enforcement of European Community norms. That is, under
Article 214, Referral to the Court, domestic courts in Member
States are commended to refer to the Caribbean Court cases where
resolution of issues of Community law are necessary for
adjudication.246  This referral mechanism, very effective in the
implementation of the single market in the European Union
context, may become a powerful tool in the hands of Caribbean
citizens. These citizens may thereby be able to enforce rights
conferred by the Community through the Revised Treaty or by
Organ or CCJ decision.
This development will be dependent both on the necessary
discretion of domestic courts-will they "recognize," i.e., take
judicial notice of, issues of Community law as necessary to their
adjudication of domestic cases?-and the reputation and regard in
243 See Smith, supra note 1.
244 See id.
245 See supra note 133 and accompanying text for discussion of the Article 234 of
the Consolidated Treaty.
246 In addition, and perhaps more importantly and more revolutionary, Article 222,
explicitly recognizes the right of private parties to intervene in cases involving Member
States before the Caribbean Court of Justice enforces rights and benefits provided under
the Treaty. The provision does outline a three-step substantive test, perhaps overly
dependent on the discretion of the Caribbean Court, but does open the door to direct
citizen involvement. See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 222.
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which the Caribbean Court will be held. Also relevant will be the
ability of the Caribbean Court to assert a broad ranging
jurisdiction and its perceived and actual powers of enforcement.
Within the European Union, the exercise of this feature has been
dependent on close collaboration and mutual respect between the
European Court of Justice and the domestic courts of Member
States.247
Other than the provisions above, the Revised Treaty makes
little provision for the voice or participation of the citizens of
Member States. For example, the Revised Treaty designates the
"Association" of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians as a
"mere" Institution of the Community,248 instead of incorporating
the Assembly as a Body or Organ of CARICOM, and omits a
specific role for that body. These actions 9trongly indicate that the
political process and direction of integration is divorced from the
Caribbean people and lacks a foundation in democratic
principles. 24
9
Unlike the Parliament of the European Union, the members of
the Assembly are not specifically elected to the Assembly.250
Rather, majority and opposition members of Parliament from
CARICOM Member States are designated by their home
Parliaments, ensuring that it is the voice of the establishment,
and not that of an independent or gadfly expressly chosen by the
voters for that purpose.
The Assembly is rendered powerless by the narrow scope of its
operations. It may make recommendations to the Conference,
Council, Institutions, and Associate Institutions;252 request reports
from those bodies; 253 discuss and make recommendations on any
247 BERMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 352-55.
248 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, art. 21.
249 For discussion of the "democratic deficit" in the European Union, see BERMAN
ET AL., supra note 38, at 1229-31.
250 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 30, art. 190.
251 See Agreement for the Establishment of an Assembly of Caribbean Community
Parliamentarians, art. 3 [hereinafter ACCP Agreement], reprinted in Pollard, supra note
8.
252 See ACCP Agreement, supra note 251, art. 5(a).
253 Id. art. 5(b).
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matter within the scope of Community objectives;2 4 adopt
resolutions on issues arising out of the 1973 Treaty;255 and discuss
and make recommendations on issues referred to it by the
Conference.256 The Assembly may not itself initiate proposals to
implement integration. It does not have to be consulted, nor is its
consent necessary to approval of the initiatives of Community
Organs.257
In sum, the Assembly provides little more than a forum for
discussion, severely limiting the implementation of the objectives
outlined in Article 4 of the ACCP Agreement.2 58  The objectives
include the involvement of the people of the Community, the
creation of opportunities for the involvement of Member State
parliamentarians and people in the integration process, monitoring,
and enhancing coordination opportunities for Member State
parliamentarians. Handicapped by the powerless role assigned to
it and low Member State interest in its functioning, the
performance of the Assembly has been disappointing, having little
impact on the project of economic or other integration.259
The reluctance to involve citizens in the integration process is
further exemplified by provisions in both the 1973 Treaty 260 and
Revised Treaty, 6 which limit the free movement of people to
254 Id. art. 5(c).
255 Id. art. 5(e). Note that the ACCP Agreement was drafted to work in conjunction
with the 1973 Treaty. It should be amended to reflect the institutional changes wrought
by Revised Treaty.
256 Id. art. 5(d).
257 ACCP Agreement, supra note 251, art. 5(d). The European Parliament also has
limited legislative function. The institutional structure of the Union determines that it is
the Commission, not the Parliament, which proposes legislation. See BERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 54. However, in response to the allegations of democratic deficit, there
has been incremental additional involvement, and a movement to add a co-decision
function to the consultation function of the European Parliament. The European
Parliament demonstrated its power when Jose Miguel Barroso, the Commission's
incoming President, withdrew his proposed slate of 24 commissioners in order to avoid
the Parliament's expected rejection of that slate. Bilefsky, supra note 10.
258 See ACCP Agreement, supra note 251.
259 See Erskine Sandiford, The Assembly of Carribean Community
Parliamentarians, in BEYOND SURVIVAL, supra note 15, at 314. But see Pollard, supra
note 8, at 228.
260 See 1973 Treaty Annex, supra note 11, art. 38.
261 See Revised Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 45, 46 (expressly limiting the freedom
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skilled persons, university graduates, sports figures, artists, and
musicians.262  It is both ironic and a testament to the
resourcefulness of the Caribbean people that the movement of
people among Member States is significant.263
As discussed in Part III, the adherence of formerly colonized
states to the ideals and myth of sovereignty enable strong leaders
to act with broad competence in the domestic sphere. By clinging
to the attributes of sovereignty that doctrinal and geo-political
developments of the post-World War II era have constrained, both
domestically and internationally, they are able to exercise the
broad domestic discretion that more closely fits into their
conception of sovereignty. The adherence to an outdated and
unrealistic conception of sovereignty is a fundamental cause of the
aspirational quality of CARICOM economic integration.
VII. Conclusion
As the Community approached the six-month mark prior to the
projected launch of the CSME, economic and political
developments within and outside the Community highlighted the
challenges of effective implementation of Caribbean regional
integration:
1. Member State, The Bahamas, officially announced that it
would adopt a wait-and-see approach and would not
participate in the CSME for at least the first two years.264
2. At the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of
Government of the Caribbean Community, held in St. Lucia
on July 3-6, 2005, Antigua and Barbuda lobbied for "Special
of movement of Community nationals to "skilled" persons).
262 Id. Although Article 45 of Revised Treaty provides that "Member States commit
themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the Community,"
Article 46 imposes the limitations listed in the text above. Id.
263 For example, in Antigua, foreigners (Guyanese, Jamaicans, and Dominicans
(from the Dominican Republic)) "make up 27 percent of the 42,000 registered voters
eligible to cast ballots in national elections" scheduled for March 2004. See Robinson,
Claude, The Media and Caribbean Integration, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2004,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/html/20040118t0l 0000-0500_54492_obsthe
_medi aandcaribbeanintegration.asp.
264 Anita Joseph, The Bahamas Rejects the Creation of CSME, Thus Compromising
CARICOM's Integration Bid, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS, July 12, 2005, http://www.
caribbeannetnews.comI2005/07/l 2/rejects.shtml.
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and Differential Treatment" within the common market for
itself and other CARICOM members of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (the OECS). 265
3. At the same meeting, Trinidad and Tobago exposed conflict
among the Member States regarding Venezuela's Petrocaribe
initiative,266 under which Venezuela seeks to sell pertroleum
products at a discounted rate to CARICOM Member States.267
Trinidad and Tobago, the traditional supplier of energy
resources to CARICOM Member States, expressed
reservations about the initiative.
4. A few weeks after the Conference of Heads of Government
meeting, the Dominican Republic, already a Community
trading partner under the 1998 free trade agreement,
announced its desire to join CARICOM,268 presenting
CARICOM with the prospect of widening the Community
with the addition of an economy which is five times the size
of the largest economy among the existing Member States.269
5. On August 1, 2005, a WTO arbitrator issued a report on the
European Union's proposed new banana regime finding that
the proposed tariff system violated the European Union's
obligations under the GATT/WTO system.2 70  The report
inflicted further damage to the prospects of the ailing banana
265 Antigua-Barbuda Pushes for Special Treatment for OECS States, supra note
117.
266 Rickey Singh, Two Big Summit Surprises, JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 10, 2005,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/html/20050709t210000-0500_83871_obs_
two-big-summit-surprises.asp.
267 Id. Trinidad and Tobago's perception of the threat posed to its oil-based
economy, the potential diversion of its market, and diminution of its Community role
conflicts with the potential benefits to other Member States because of the availability of
cheaper energy resources from Venezuela.
268 Dominican Republic wants to join CARICOM, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER
INTERNET EDITION, July 26, 2005, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html
/20050725t210000-0500_84841 obs dominican-republic wants-to-join caricom.asp.
269 Id. Estimated at US$55 billion in 2004, the Dominican Republic would be the
largest economy in CARICOM.
270 See Decision of the Ministerial Conference, European Communities-The ACP-
EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15 (Nov. 14, 2001), http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/ministe/min0le/mindeclacp ec-agre-e.pdf. See also Big Blow for




industries of the banana-producing Member States.
6. The political and humanitarian situation of Member State
Haiti remains dire and unresolved. Elections are scheduled
for fall 2005 but, as of late July 2005, only thirteen percent of
the electorate was reported to have registered to vote, casting
doubt on the perceived legitimacy of any electoral outcome.27'
7. Other internal developments include resistance and objection
by at least one Member State's leader to a perceived increase
in the power wielded by the CARICOM Secretariat and its
bureaucrats 27 2 and a call by Jamaica's opposition party for
regional referenda on the CSME and the CCJ.27 3  The
opposition party explained that it was seeking "that the
region's people be given a direct say in the decision, 274 and
made clear that it was particularly troubled by the impact of
the CSME and the CCJ on "the sovereign authority of
individual states. 275
8. While these developments transpired, other regional trading
arrangements that will affect CARICOM Member States
interests were underway on several fronts, including: a
proposed partnership by CARICOM and the Dominican
Republic for the completion of an Economic Partnership
Agreement with the European Union, 276 approval of the
CAFTA by the U.S. Congress, 277 and ongoing negotiations
between the U.S. and Andean nations.278
271 See Aristide's Party to Run in Haiti's Elections, JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 26,
2005, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050725t210000-0500_84842_obs_
aristide_s_party-to-run in-haitielections.asp.
272 See Rickey Singh, CARICOM Bureaucrats Stealing Our Power-Gonsalves,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 24, 2005, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/htm/2005
0623t220000-0500_82978obs caricom-bureaucrats-stealing-ourpower__gonsalves.asp.





276 See CUOPM.org, External Trade Negotiations Reviewed by CARICOM Heads,
The Communications Unit of the Office of the Prime Minister, St. Kitts & Nevis,
http://www.cuopm.com/newsitem.asp?articlenumber=466.
277 See Negotiators Arrive in Miami for U.S.-Andean Trade Talks, supra note 121.
278 Id.
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Member States must confront internal dissension and lack of
implementation, as well as challenges on several external fronts.
In light of a thirty-year history of false starts and hesitations, are
the Community's Member States prepared to achieve the regional
economic integration they purport to seek?
The integration sought by the founders of CARICOM has been
a merely aspirational one, whose achievements have been limited
to the areas of intra-Community functional coordination and, to
some extent, foreign policy coordination. In the sphere of
development and economic integration, CARICOM has not risen
to the challenges posed to it by the unique circumstances of the
region. Instead, the Member States have allowed themselves to be
seduced by the myth of sovereignty, failing to develop the strength
that would be conferred by economic integration.
Nevertheless, both the Revised Treaty, and the fundamental
structural changes it seeks to effect in the Caribbean Community,
evince a consciousness of and movement toward integration by
Community leaders. In particular, the elimination of the
unanimity requirement for valid decision-making by Community
Organs and Bodies, the CCJ Agreement and launch of the CCJ, as
well as the dispute resolution provisions of the Revised Treaty,
speak to a greater will to commit to integration.
However, the weakness of an institutional framework that
serves to handicap smooth decision-making, the ability of Member
States to opt out of binding Community decisions-together with
a flawed dispute resolution mechanism-and the long delay in
implementing the CCJ Agreement and in transposing Community
obligations into national legislation279 paint a bleak picture of lack
of resolve and an inability to carry forward the fundamental
integration to which both the 1973 Treaty and the Revised Treaty
appear to aspire.
Member States, dazzled by the myth of sovereignty and
jealously guarding formal indicators of such sovereignty-perhaps
279 See, e.g., New Companies Act prepares JA for Carib single market, JAMAICAN
OBSERVER, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/magazines/business/html/
20040308t01 0000-0500_56760_obs-new-companies-act-prepares.ja-for-carib-single
market.asp (describing the passage in the Jamaican Senate of legislation intended to
harmonize Jamaican laws regulating businesses with those of other Caribbean countries).




inevitably, in light of the ever present threat posed by U.S.
hegemony 280-have, as yet, wrought a purely aspirational
economic integration. Clearly inspired, in part, by the success of
the European Union, they have failed to make the sovereignty
concessions of the EU's Member States 281 or encourage or
facilitate the participation of Caribbean citizens in the integration
effort.282
The Member States appear to be more willing to pool
sovereignties to achieve political ends or make symbolic stands.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the 2004 actions of
Jamaican officials in response to the leadership and humanitarian
crises in Haiti raise the possibility that Jamaica-and, perhaps,
CARICOM-sought to use this opportunity to create a new locus
of power in the Caribbean. The sojourn of deposed President
Bertrand Aristide in Jamaica might have been a power play by
Jamaica, with the intent of demonstrating to the United States that
the reach of its hegemony will go only so far.
283
If such was Jamaica's-and, by extension, CARICOM's-
intent, it appears to have failed. Although the Community appears
steadfast in its refusal to recognize the interim Haitian
government, rifts soon appeared in the unified stance when foreign
ministers from Barbados, The Bahamas, Guyana, and Trinidad and
280 For example, after ignoring or decrying as inappropriate CARICOM calls for a
peacekeeping mission to Haiti prior to the escalation of the unrest that removed Aristide,
the United States later sought to coerce CARICOM states to embrace the "legitimacy" of
the interim government installed in Haiti with the United States' blessings. See Powell
Pledges to Help Latortue on CARICOM Recognition, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Apr. 6, 2004,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040406t010000-0500_58187-obs-powell
_pledges-.to.helpjlatortueon_caricomrecognition.asp; Rickey Singh, CARICOM
Spurns Recognition Bid from Interim Haiti Government, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Mar. 28,
2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040328T020000-0500 57766_OBS
_CARICOMSPURNSRECOGNITIONBIDFROM_INTERIMHAITIGOVT.asp.
281 See supra Parts IV and V for analysis.
282 The United States made no secret that it is not enamored with Aristide, failing to
intervene in the violent upheaval that preceded his ouster until after Aristide's departure
was inevitable. See supra note 6. Viewed in the most charitable light, the U.S. pressure
on CARICOM members to recognize the interim Haitian regime carries political heft,
indicating, perhaps, successful pooling of sovereignties in the coordination of foreign
relations.
283 Indeed, Aristide claims that he did not leave Haiti voluntarily, but was kidnapped
by the forces of the United States and conveyed to the Central African Republic against
his will. See Aristide Visit Triggers Row, supra note 6.
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Tobago met with the interim president in Port-au-Prince.284
However, the Community may be improving its international
political heft. Delegates from China, Japan, Italy, Brazil, and
India attended the July 2005 Conference of Heads of Government
in St. Lucia, seeking CARICOM's support for a proposed
expansion of the UN Security Council.
28 5
In order to effectuate true regional economic integration,
among the critical development tasks that confront the Community
are:
1. Diversification of the economies of mono- or duo-agricultural
producers among the Member States in order to adapt to the
elimination of preferences on banana and sugar products.
2. Introduction of initiatives for the effective education of the
populace to improve the skill level of workers and their ability
to function in the higher technology global labor market.
3. Cooperation in peace-keeping and disaster preparedness, so
that the weak and ineffective CARICOM response to natural
disasters in Grenada and Haiti and to the violent upheaval in
Haiti become relics of the past.
In light of this analysis, in order for the CARICOM economic
integration model to succeed I recommend that the Community
undertake the following institutional changes:
1. Strengthen the Secretariat's role and scope of competence so
that it assumes an executive and enforcement role, instead of
its current administrative and facilitative one.
2. Increase the coordination of activities and competences
among the Community institutions, including the elimination
of redundant organizations.
3. Demand domestic implementation of Community
undertakings within a brief, limited turnaround period,
enforced with the imposition of credible coercive sanctions.
4. Formalize and strengthen the participation of the citizenry,
particularly through the expansion of the role of the ACCP
(Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians).
284 Barbados Creates Rift Within CARICOM: See Who Are the Heroes and Who
Are the Knaves, June 6, 2005, http://www.marguefitelaurent.com/pressclips/riftin
CARICOM.html.
285 Antigua-Barbuda Pushes for Special Treatment for OECS States, supra note
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5. Include the citizens of the Member States in the integration
process through education about the aims and mechanisms of
regional economic integration.
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